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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY OF
DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE AND THE RIGHT
TO RECEIVE UNBIASED MEDICAL ADVICE
PAULA BERG*
The practice of medicine invariably reflects and reinforces a culture's
dominant ideology and its patterns of social and economic organization.'
During certain historical periods, however, governments have overtly
politicized the practice of medicine, restricting access to medical informa-
tion and directly manipulating the content of doctor-patient discourse.2
For example, during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese physicians were
dispatched to the countryside to convince peasants to use contraception. 3
* Visiting Assistant Professor, City University of New York Law School. J.D.,
Rutgers University School of Law-Newark, 1982; B.A., Hampshire College, 1977. I
am especially grateful for Stephen Loffredo's criticism and suggestions and Gina
Goldstein's editorial advice and support. Thanks also to Ruthann Robson; Pamela
Forman and Lisa Sbrana, my research assistants; and to the staff of CUNY Law
School's library.
I See Arthur M. Kleinman, Medicine's Symbolic Reality: On a Central Problem in
the Philosophy of Medicine, 16 INQUIRY 206, 208 (1973):
The medical system is an ordered, coherent body of ideas, values, and practices
embedded in a given cultural context from which it derives its signification. It is
an important part of the cultural world and as such it is constructed, like any
other segment of social reality, by the regnant body of symbolic
meanings. ...
Medical systems function along the lines of the cultural dialectic, relating and
treating both individual and social realities.
2 This Article uses the terms "doctor-patient discourse," "doctor-patient speech,"
and "doctor-patient communication" interchangeably to refer to oral communication
between physicians and patients that occurs after the formation of a professional rela-
tionship concerning diagnosis, treatment alternatives, and the wide range of subjects
that are commonly discussed in the course of treatment decision making.
3 See Penny Kane, Family Planning in China, in HEALTH CARE AND TRADITIONAL
MEDICINE IN CHINA 1800-1982, at 426, 431 (S.M. Miller & J.A. Jewell eds., 1983). A
more radical proposal to manipulate the content of doctor-patient discourse is cur-
rently pending in China. To reduce the number of disabled people in the Chinese
population, the Minister of Public Health recently proposed legislation that would
require physicians to "advise" pregnant women diagnosed as having infectious dis-
eases or carrying abnormal fetuses to have an abortion. Patrick E. Tyler, China
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In the 1930s, the Soviet government expedited completion of a construc-
tion project on the Siberian railroad by ordering doctors to both reject
requests for medical leave from work and conceal this government order
from their patients.4 In Nazi Germany, the Third Reich systematically
violated the separation between state ideology and medical discourse.5
German physicians were taught that they owed a higher duty to the
"health of the Volk" than to the health of individual patients.6 Recently,
Nicolae Ceausescu's strategy to increase the Romanian birth rate
included prohibitions against giving advice to patients about the use of
birth control devices and disseminating information about the use of con-
doms as a means of preventing the transmission of AIDS.7
In the United States, ideology-based restrictions on doctor-patient
speech have thus far been limited to discussions about abortion and con-
traception.8 Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that criminalize
Weighs Using Sterilization and Abortions to Stop Single "Abnormal" Births, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993, at A8.
4 MARK G. FIELD, DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA 168-69 (1957).
5 See generally MICHAEL H. KATER, DOCTORS UNDER HITLER 111-26 (1989)
(describing the infiltration of Nazi ideology into the study of medical science at uni-
versities); Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Doctors, Racial Medicine, and Human Experimen-
tation, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 17-31 (George J. Annas
& Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) (describing the complicity of the medical profession
in implementing racial policies).
6 See ROBERT J. L1FTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLINGS AND THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 30 (1986) (describing a manual advocating that doctors
embrace a public duty to maintain racial purity). The government also required phy-
sicians to report the names of persons with genetic illnesses for possible sterilization.
Id. at 25; see also KATER, supra note 5, at 121 (noting the addition of "race hygiene"
courses into medical schools' curricula).
7 David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, How AIDS Came to Romania, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1990, at 5. Ceausescu's "pronatal campaign" also required gov-
ernment investigations into the death of any infant under the age of one year. To
avoid these investigations, Romanian physicians used drastic means to keep children
alive until after their first birthday, including unnecessary prophylactic injections of
antibiotics and whole blood, which resulted in the spread of AIDS among young chil-
dren from the use of unsterile needles. Id. at 6-7.
8 Restrictions on physician speech in this country have been less extreme than
those in Germany and the U.S.S.R. However, in developing a First Amendment the-
ory of doctor-patient discourse, this Article adopts the "pathological perspective"
described by Professor Vincent Blasi:
[I]n adjudicating first amendment disputes and fashioning first amendment doc-
trines, courts ought to adopt what might be termed the pathological perspective.
That is, the overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amend-
ment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and
most likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other words,
should be targeted for the worst of times.
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physician speech about these subjects.9 In 1988, the Bush Administration
implemented a regulation forbidding doctors working in publicly funded
clinics from counseling patients about abortion.'" In addition to silencing
doctors' speech, some states have passed laws compelling physicians to
make specific statements to patients in order to persuade them to make
medical decisions in conformity with governmental opinion." Illinois
enacted a law requiring physicians to give the following written statement
to all patients seeking an abortion: "The State of Illinois wants you to
know that in its view the child you are carrying is a living human being
whose life should be preserved. Illinois strongly encourages you not to
have an abortion but to go through to childbirth.' 12
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 449-50 (1985).
9 Statutes criminalizing physician speech about contraception and abortion have
not survived judicial scrutiny. Most courts have, however, rested their decisions on
privacy grounds rather than on the First Amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute prohibiting counsel-
ing on contraception violated the right to privacy). In Guam Soc. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1428-29 (D. Guam 1990), affd, 962 F.2d
1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992), the district court held that the
section of a statute prohibiting the solicitation of women to have abortions violated
the First Amendment, id. at 1429 n.9, and that the entire statute violated the right to
privacy, id. at 1429. The court's First Amendment holding appears to rest on the view
that the statute violated physicians' right to speak, not patients' right to receive medi-
cal advice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the statute
violated the right to privacy; the First Amendment discussion was not addressed on
appeal. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
1o 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1992). The Supreme Court upheld these regulations against
First Amendment attack. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771-73 (1991). See dis-
cussion infra notes 29, 37-43 and accompanying text. On January 22, 1993, President
Clinton issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) to suspend this rule because it interfered with the doctor-patient relation-
ship. 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993). On February 5, 1993, the Secretary complied with this
executive order. Id. at 7462.
11 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a) (1983 & Supp. 1993) (requiring
physicians to inform patients of abortion risks and alternatives). The Supreme Court
has invalidated a city ordinance that required physicians to recite a lengthy and bur-
densome list of information to patients seeking abortions. City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (holding that the ordinance
went beyond merely ensuring that the patient understood the implications of having
an abortion). For a compendium of state statutes regulating doctor-patient speech
about abortion, see Lynn D. Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services and the Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881, 962-63 (1989).
12 Pub. Act 81-1078, § 3.5(2), 1979 I11. Laws 4108, 4115 (repealed 1984). In Charles
v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980), the court upheld a permanent injunction
preventing the state from enforcing portions of the law, including a section that
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On several occasions over the past 30 years, the United States Supreme
Court has considered the constitutionality of statutes that included provi-
sions directly regulating the content of doctor-patient speech.' 3 How-
ever, until Rust v. Sullivan 4 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5 the
Supreme Court never had to face the issue of whether restrictions on the
content of doctor-patient speech violate the First Amendment. 6 Prior to
Rust and Casey, advocates challenging statutes that included restrictions
on physician speech about contraception or abortion did not assert that
those provisions violated the First Amendment. 7 Instead, they argued
imposed criminal penalties on physicians who failed to give this policy statement to
patients. The court held that the statute unconstitutionally violated physicians' First
Amendment rights. Id. at 789. Illinois did not appeal the decision, and an appeal by a
private physician to the Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Dia-
mond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71 (1986).
'3 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (consider-
ing a statute that forbade public employees from counseling a woman to have an
abortion not necessary to save her life); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760-64 (1986) (invalidating a statute requiring
that certain information be given to a woman before she consents to an abortion);
City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45 (invalidating informed consent provisions designed
to persuade a woman not to have an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976) (upholding a provision requiring a woman to give written con-
sent to an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (considering a
statute prohibiting counseling about contraception and family planning); Poe v. Ull-
man, 376 U.S. 497, 498 (1961) (same).
The other abortion cases that have reached the Supreme Court have not concerned
statutes regulating the content of doctor-patient discourse. See, e.g., H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398, 400 (1981) (requirement of parental notification when minors
sought abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980) (prohibition of the use
of federal funds to perform certain abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977)
(prohibition of the use of state funds for nontherapeutic abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973) (criminalization of attempts to administer or procure abor-
tions); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184 (1973) (requirement that abortions be per-
formed in a hospital only after approval by a hospital committee and confirmation
from two physicians).
14 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
15 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech . . ").
17 Despite provisions directed at the content of doctor-patient speech about abor-
tion or contraception, no First Amendment argument was made to the Supreme
Court in Poe, Danforth, City of Akron, or Thornburgh. In Webster, the appellees
conceded that a First Amendment challenge to a Missouri statute restricting public
employees from speaking about abortion within the scope of their employment was
moot because of the state's assertion that this provision was not aimed at the conduct
of any public or private health care provider. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 512.
Appellants in Griswold argued that the statutes at issue violated physicians' First
Amendment rights. Brief for Appellants at 91-94, Griswold (No. 64-496). However,
DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE
that the entire enactment, including the speech-related provisions, vio-
lated the privacy right established in Griswold v. Connecticut.' Thus,
Rust and Casey presented the Supreme Court with a historic opportunity
to delineate the extent to which the First Amendment restrains govern-
ment from politicizing the practice of medicine by manipulating the con-
tent of doctors' conversations with patients.1 9
Unfortunately, the Rehnquist Court did not rise to the occasion.
Instead, with little or no First Amendment analysis, the Court upheld the
speech restrictions at issue in both cases and, in the process, recognized a
government power to impose viewpoint-based2" regulations on doctor-
patient speech in both publicly and privately financed settings.2' By
doing so, the Rehnquist Court reversed the position of the Burger Court,
the Court did not address these arguments in its opinion. There is a dearth of schol-
arly discussion of the relationship between the First Amendment and doctor-patient
discourse. Indeed, there are no articles analyzing the First Amendment status of com-
munication within the confines of relationships between any type of licensed profes-
sional and his or her patients or clients.
18 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In retrospect, it appears that a better strategy might have
been to assert that restrictions on conduct associated with performing abortions vio-
lated women's right to privacy, while restrictions on speech about abortion violated
both the right to privacy and patients' rights under the First Amendment. This two-
pronged strategy might have placed women's right to obtain information about abor-
tion and contraception from their physicians on a more secure constitutional footing.
The relatively liberal Burger Court might have recognized that the First Amendment
protects doctor-patient discourse and prohibits the government from imposing view-
point-based restrictions to limit patients' acquisition of information.
19 In several abortion and contraception cases involving speech restrictions upon
physicians, dissenting Justices noted the possibility of a First Amendment violation,
even though this argument had not been made to the Court. In their opinions, how-
ever, the dissenting Justices exclusively concentrated on the restrictions' impact on
physicians' right to speak and ignored the effects on patients' right to receive unbi-
ased information. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 472 n.16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This is not to say that the informed-
consent provisions may not violate the First Amendment rights of physicians if the
State requires him or her to communicate its ideology."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-
508 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I can think of no reasons at this time why their expres-
sions of views would not be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
which guarantee freedom of speech"); Poe, 367 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The right of the doctor to advise his patients [about contraception] according to his
best lights seems so obviously within [the] First Amendment . . . as to need no
extended discussion.").
20 Viewpoint-based regulations "aim at ideas or information, in the sense of sin-
gling out actions for government control or penalty either (a) because of the specific
message or viewpoint such actions express, or (b) because of the effects produced by
awareness of the information or ideas such actions impart." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988).
21 See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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which had repeatedly invalidated viewpoint-based restrictions on physi-
cian speech on right to privacy grounds.22 Although the Rehnquist Court
set limits on this newly recognized government prerogative, 23 it did not
sufficiently restrain the government from using doctor-patient discourse
as a tool for indoctrination, nor did it protect patients' interest in receiv-
ing the information they need to exercise meaningfully their constitu-
tional right to determine the course of their medical treatment.24
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it critiques Rust and Casey
and suggests that the Rehnquist Court relied on faulty logic in reaching
its conclusion about the right of government to regulate the content of
physician speech. Specifically, it argues that the Court misunderstood the
dynamics of doctor-patient interaction, and as a result, grossly underesti-
mated the danger that patients will be coerced and confused by govern-
ment messages delivered by physicians.2 5 Moreover, the Court did not
recognize that the principal constitutional threat posed by government
restrictions on the content of doctor-patient speech is not their infringe-
ment on physicians' speech rights. Rather, the more serious peril of such
measures is that they enable government to impose its orthodoxy on
medical decision making by limiting and biasing the medical information
available to patients.26
Second, this Article strives to succeed where Rust and Casey failed by
developing a First Amendment theory of doctor-patient discourse that
appreciates and protects patients' interests in receiving complete, unbi-
ased medical information and advice.27 This theory proceeds from the
premise that government regulation of doctor-patient speech may in
some cases be necessary to increase the flow of information to patients,
thereby facilitating the attainment of consent and thus advancing the First
Amendment goals of self-fulfillment and autonomy.28 The practical
22 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 760 (1986) (stating that the state cannot require the delivery of information
aimed at persuading a patient to choose childbirth over abortion). The Burger
Court's view that speech restrictions that seek to influence patients' medical decisions
are unconstitutional reflects its more sophisticated understanding of the asymmetrical
nature of doctor-patient communication, see infra notes 123-45 and accompanying
text, and its appreciation of the danger of coercion that exists when physicians
become mouthpieces for state policy, see, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763 (noting
that forcing physicians to present the state's view to patients makes them agents of
the state and places physicians' imprimatur upon this view).
23 See infra text accompanying note 93.
24 Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that competent patients
have a constitutional liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
25 See infra notes 123-45 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
27 See discussion infra part V.
28 This necessity of regulation emanates from the long history of physicians with-
holding information from patients about alternative treatments and associated risks.
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objective of a First Amendment theory of doctor-patient speech therefore
must be to aid courts in distinguishing between regulations that
encourage the disclosure of information necessary for rational, autono-
mous medical choices, and those that impose official dogma upon medical
choices.
Parts I and II of this Article discuss and critique the Supreme Court's
decisions in Rust and Casey regarding government restrictions on doctor-
patient speech. Part III analyzes the appropriate level of First Amend-
ment protection for doctor-patient speech in light of the free speech val-
ues that it implicates. Part IV examines the problem of government
restrictions that silence physician speech. Finally, Part V examines the
First Amendment implications of regulations compelling physician speech
and proposes a test for assessing such regulations' constitutionality.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF DOCTOR-
PATIENT DISCOURSE
In Rust v. Sullivan,29 the Court was asked to determine the constitu-
tionality of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 1988
reinterpretation of Title X of the Public Health Services Act.3" The Act
authorizes the Secretary of HHS to administer grants and enter into con-
tracts to establish and operate family planning projects that offer "a
broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods." 3' No
For a discussion of this history and the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent,
which requires the disclosure of treatment alternatives and associated material risks
to patients, see PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A His-
TORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
29 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). A number of excellent articles and notes have been writ-
ten about the "gag rule" and the Rust decision. See, e.g., Janet Benshoof, The Chas-
tity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First Amendment,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1916, 1931-33 (1988) (arguing that one-sided presentation of preg-
nancy options undermines the First Amendment goal of autonomy); Michael Fitzpat-
rick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45
STAN. L. REV. 185 (1992) (exploring the First Amendment implications of Rust
outside the abortion clinic context); Moira T. Roberts, Note, Individual Rights and
Government Power in Collision: A Look at Rust v. Sullivan Through the Lens of
Power Analysis, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023 (1992) (discussing the tension
between congressional spending power and individual liberties); Ann B. Weeks, Note,
The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (1992) (discussing Rust's impact on rights of patients and
physicians in federally funded clinics).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1988).
31 Id. § 300(a).
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funds appropriated under the Act can be "used in programs where abor-
tion is a method of family planning."32
In 1988, HHS issued interpretive regulations to provide "clear and
operational guidance" to grantees about how to preserve the distinction
between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family planning.3
To this end, the regulations imposed a panoply of restrictions upon the
conduct 34 and speech of Title X grantees, including physicians who
worked in publicly funded family planning clinics. The speech-related
regulations prohibited physicians from providing "counseling concerning
the use of abortion as a method of family planning" and from providing
referrals to women seeking an abortion. 5 In response to a specific
request for a referral to an abortion provider, the regulations suggested
that physicians respond by stating that "the project does not consider
abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does
not counsel or refer for abortion."3 6
The doctors3 7 who mounted a facial challenge to the regulations3 8
argued that the regulations interfered with the First Amendment rights of
32 Id. § 300a-6.
33 53 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2923-24 (1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1991)).
34 The restrictions imposed on the conduct of Title X grantees prohibit lobbying
for legislation that could increase the availability of abortion, using legal action to
make abortion more available, paying dues to any pro-choice group, and failing to
maintain a financial and physical separation between Title X-funded projects and any
abortion-related activities. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1991).
35 Id. § 59.8(a)(1). The regulations also restricted grantees' speech by prohibiting
the development and dissemination of written materials advocating abortion, and by
prohibiting pro-abortion speakers. Id. § 59.10(a). This prohibition may also interfere
with patients' acquisition of medical information. However, a comprehensive analysis
of whether restrictions on written communication between doctors and patients vio-
late the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.
36 Id. § 59.8(b)(5). The regulations do not, however, require physicians to utter the
suggested response to patients who request abortion counseling or referrals; penalties
are imposed only when physicians provide abortion counseling or referrals. For the
purpose of this analysis, this Article assumes that these regulations compel silence,
rather than physician speech.
37 The petitioners, suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, were Title X
grantees and doctors who supervised Title X funds. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766. For
simplicity, this Article refers to the petitioners as "doctors" and to the respondents as
the "Government."
38 By mounting a facial challenge to the regulations, as opposed to an as-applied
challenge, the doctors faced a very heavy burden. Id. at 1767. Specifically, they were
required to "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid." Id.
(alterations in original) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
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Title X health care providers and Title X patients.39 Specifically, they
alleged that the regulations: (1) impermissibly discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint; and (2) conditioned the receipt of Title X funds upon the
surrender of a fundamental right to freedom of expression.40 While the
doctors conceded that government can place certain conditions upon the
receipt of public funds, they argued that the First Amendment forbids the
state from denying federal subsidies for the purpose of suppressing "dan-
gerous ideas."'"
In addressing the doctors' arguments, the majority did not begin by
determining the appropriate level of protection for doctor-patient
speech-the traditional starting point for a First Amendment inquiry.42
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did not include a First
Amendment analysis of the regulations, from the standpoint of either
doctors' speech or patients' right to receive medical information.43
Instead, the Court's analysis of the speech-related restrictions was.
rooted in its interpretation of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions,44 as developed in Maher v. Roe45 and Harris v. McRae.46 In those
39 Brief for Petitioners at 13, Rust (No. 89-1391). Petitioners also argued that the
regulations violated the Fifth Amendment by obstructing a woman's decision making
about her pregnancy. Id. at 31.
Three federal appellate courts considered constitutional challenges to these HHS
regulations. The First Circuit held that the regulations violated the First Amendment.
Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 73 (1st Cir. 1990)
("[T]he prohibited speech will often involve communications between a patient and
doctor, an area (given the 'life' and 'liberty' interests potentially involved) warranting
particularly strong protection."). The Second Circuit held that the regulations did not
violate the First Amendment because providers and patients were free to speak about
abortion outside the confines of a Title X program. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d
401, 412-14 (2d Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit held that the regulations violated the
First Amendment rights of doctors and patients. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1505 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the regulations "infringe
upon the doctor-patient relationship by limiting the free flow of information from the
doctor to the patient regarding abortion services").
40 Brief for Petitioners, Rust (No. 89-1391).
41 Id. at 17 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
42 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
43 Id. at 1771-72.
44 Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, "government may not condi-
tion the receipt of its benefits upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights." TRIBE,
supra note 20, § 10-8, at 681. The leading articles criticizing the Supreme Court's
conception and application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions are: Richard
A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); and Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
45 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding the state's refusal to fund nontherapeutic abor-
tions under the Medicaid program).
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decisions, the Court held that the government does not violate a woman's
right to an abortion by refusing to fund it. Women deprived of federal
assistance technically remain free to have an abortion, the Court rea-
soned, albeit without the benefit of federal funds.47
Relying on this analysis, the Rust Court determined that the HHS regu-
lations were a constitutional exercise of the government's power to fund
some activities and not others.4" According to the Court, conditioning
the receipt of federal funds on remaining silent about abortion is consis-
tent with the government's power to make funding choices in accordance
with its preference for childbirth over abortion.4" With respect to the
impact of the regulations upon physicians' speech, the Court explained
that
a doctor employed by the project may be prohibited in the course of
his project duties from counseling abortion or referring for abortion.
This is not the case of the Government "suppressing a dangerous
idea," but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from
engaging in activities outside of its scope.5"
Thus, the Rust majority endorsed the proposition that government
may, to promote its viewpoint, censor the speech of publicly funded
speakers, including physicians. The Court recognized, however, that the
government's power to impose viewpoint-based restrictions upon the
speech of recipients of public funds is not unlimited. It acknowledged
that government interference with the content of publicly funded speech
would be suspect in three areas: public fora,5 areas "expressly dedicated
to speech activity,"52 and "traditional spheres of free expression ... fun-
46 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding denial of federal funding for certain medically
necessary abortions).
47 Id. at 316-17.
48 See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (holding that the
government may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and...
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.")).
49 Id. The Court stated:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a pro-
gram to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, with-
out at the same time funding an alternate program .... In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely cho-
sen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.
Id.
50 Id. at 1772-73.
51 Id. at 1776. Public fora include "those places historically associated with First
Amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks." TRIBE, supra note 20,
§ 12-24, at 987.
52 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119
(1990)). The Court's reliance on Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), suggests that this phrase also refers to "public property which
the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity... even if
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damental to the functioning of our society."53 While the Court acknowl-
edged that the doctor-patient relationship may resemble a "traditional
sphere of free expression," which is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion,54 it ultimately rejected this analogy for two reasons. First, the Court
reasoned, the HHS regulations did not significantly impinge upon the
doctor-patient relationship because they did not require doctors to repre-
sent the government's opinions as their own.55 Second, since Title X clin-
ics do not provide post-conception medical care, the Court determined
that the relationship between clinic doctors and patients was not suffi-
ciently "all-encompassing" to justify patients' expectation that they would
receive comprehensive medical advice.56 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, a Title X clinic doctor's silence about abortion during a presenta-
tion of post-pregnancy alternatives could not reasonably be construed by
a patient as emanating from the doctor's personal opposition to
abortion.57
Because the regulations at issue in Rust applied only to publicly funded
physicians, and because the case was decided under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, the Rust opinion left unclear whether the
Court would permit government to impose viewpoint-based regulations
on doctor-patient speech that occurred in private settings. There is, how-
ever, a passage in the majority's analysis that strongly implies that speech
restrictions affecting both public and private physicians would be
unconstitutional.
In analyzing whether the Rust "gag rule" violates a woman's Fifth
Amendment right to decide whether to have an abortion,5" the Court
distinguished the HHS regulations from the speech restrictions that were
invalidated in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. " and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists.*° In City of Akron and Thornburgh, the Burger Court invalidated
enactments that required physicians to make statements to patients for
the purpose of influencing their decisions about abortion. Specifically,
the City of Akron ordinance compelled physicians to tell patients that
it was not required to create the forum in the first place." Id. at 45. Examples cited in
Perry are university meeting facilities, school board meetings, and municipal theaters.
Id. at 45-46.
11 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The Court ultimately rejected the Petitioners' Fifth Amendment argument. Id.
at 1776-78.
59 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
60 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception."'"
Moreover, both the City of Akron ordinance and the Thornburgh statute
compelled physicians to make statements to patients that humanized the
fetus 62 and conveyed the message that the government preferred child-
birth over abortion.6" Finally, both measures compelled physicians to
emphasize the potential risks and complications associated with the abor-
tion procedure.64
In assessing the constitutionality of these restrictions, the Burger Court
flatly rejected the proposition that the Constitution permits government
to manipulate the content of doctor-patient speech for the purpose of
61 AKRON, OHIO, AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES, ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B)(3)
(1973), reprinted in City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 421 nn.2-8.
62 The City of Akron ordinance required that physicians inform a pregnant woman
of the fetus' gestational age and anatomical and physiological characteristics and pro-
vide information about the fetus' "appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including
pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of internal organs
and the presence of external members." Id.
The Thornburgh statute required physicians to deliver printed materials to patients
that described the fetus' probable anatomical and physiological characteristics in two-
week gestational increments. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3208(a)(2) (1983), amended
by 1988 Pub. L. 262, No. 31, § 4, and 1989 Pub. L. 592, No. 64, § 2.
63 The City of Akron ordinance compelled physicians to tell patients about the
availability of birth control, prenatal, and adoption services, and to provide a list of
these agencies if requested. AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(B)(6)-(7).
The Thornburgh statute also required that physicians tell patients: that medical
assistance benefits were available for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care; that
the father was liable for child support, even if he has offered to pay for the abortion;
and that printed materials were available from the Commonwealth that described the
fetus and listed agencies offering alternatives to abortion. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3205(a)(2). The printed materials included the following statement:
There are many public and private agencies willing and able to help you to carry
your child to term, and to assist you and your child after your child is born,
whether you choose to keep your child or to place her or him for adoption. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact them before mak-
ing a final decision about abortion. The law requires that your physician or his
agent give you the opportunity to call agencies like these before your undergo an
abortion.
Id. § 3208(a)(1).
64 The City of Akron ordinance required that physicians tell patients "[tihat abor-
tion is a major surgical procedure which can result in serious complications, including
hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscar-
riage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may ... worsen
any existing psychological problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional
disturbances." AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(B)(5).
The Thornburgh statute required that physicians express the "fact that there may
be detrimental physical and psychological effects of abortion which are not accurately
foreseeable" and the particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion
procedure to be employed. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(ii)-(iii).
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influencing patients' decision making. 5 The Court reaffirmed its holding
in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth6 that government may legitimately
require physicians to convey information to patients to ensure informed
consent,67 but it may not impose speech restrictions intended to influence
patients' decision making in accordance with governmental ideology. 68
In Rust, however, the majority relied on a factual distinction between
the HHS regulations and the statutes at issue in City of Akron and
Thornburgh to circumvent the Burger Court's rejection of content
restrictions on physician speech. The Rust Court noted that the HHS
regulations applied only to publicly funded physicians, while the City of
Akron and Thornburgh restrictions had applied to both publicly and pri-
vately financed physicians.69 This distinction suggests that the Court
would deem viewpoint-based restrictions on physician speech unconstitu-
tional if they applied to all physicians in a jurisdiction.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,7° decided only one year after Rust,
the Court jettisoned this implied limit on the government's power to
impose viewpoint-based regulations on physician speech. Casey involved
the constitutionality of 1988 and 1989 amendments to a Pennsylvania
statute7 1 that revived many of the provisions previously invalidated by
the Burger Court in Thornburgh.72 In addition to imposing limitations
on physicians' conduct, 73 the amended statute's "informed consent" pro-
65 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760 ("[T]he State may not require the delivery of infor-
mation designed to 'influence the woman's informed choice between abortion and
childbirth.'" (quoting City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-44)).
66 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
67 Id. at 66-67 (upholding state's informed consent provisions).
68 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
69 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
70 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
71 1988 Pub. L. 262, No. 31, § 4; 1989 Pub. L. 592, No. 64, § 2 (amending Abortion
Control Act, 1982 Pub. L. 476, No. 138, § 1 (codified as amended at 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1993))).
72 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
73 As amended, § 3209 prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a
married woman who had not provided the physician with a signed statement either
that she had notified her husband of her intention to have an abortion, or that she fell
within one of four limited exceptions. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1983 & Supp.
1993). Section 3205 prohibited a physician from performing an abortion less than 24
hours after satisfying the "informed consent" requirements. Id. § 3205. Section 3206
criminalized the performance of an abortion on a woman under 18 years old without
parental consent. Id. § 3206. Section 3214 required that abortion facilities file
reports, to be made available for public inspection, showing the total number of abor-
tions performed in each trimester, the age of each patient, each patient's prior
number of pregnancies and abortions, the weight of each aborted fetus, the marital
status of each patient, and, in the case of married patients, whether notice was pro-
vided to the husband. Id. § 3214.
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vision required that physicians tell every abortion-seeking patient about
the health risks of abortion and childbirth74 and the probable gestational
age of the fetus.75 It also mandated that physicians76 tell patients about
the availability of printed materials, which described the fetus and listed
agencies that offered alternatives to abortion; stated that the child's
father was liable for financial assistance to support the child (even if he
had offered to pay for the abortion); and stated that medical assistance
may be available for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care."
Unlike the restrictions at issue in Rust, the so-called informed consent
provisions in Casey did not silence physician speech. Like the HHS regu-
lations, however, the Pennsylvania statute's speech-related provisions
directly regulated the content of physician-patient discourse for the pur-
pose of persuading patients to elect a governmentally preferred course of
action.78 Thus, in Casey the Court again faced the question of whether
the First Amendment prohibited government from imposing viewpoint-
based restrictions on doctor-patient speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had consid-
ered and rejected the petitioners' 79 argument that the Pennsylvania stat-
ute's informed consent provisions violated the First Amendment.80 The
court held that doctor-patient discourse was commercial speech,8' and
that government could compel disclosures provided they were not false
74 Id. § 3205(a)(1)(i), (iii).
75 Id. § 3205(a)(1)(ii).
76 The statute allowed a physician to delegate his or her obligation to inform
patients about the availability of the state's written materials to another health care
professional, such as a physician's assistant, health care practitioner, technician, or
social worker. Id. § 3205(a)(2).
77 Id. § 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii).
78 The Pennsylvania General Assembly's preference for childbirth over abortion is
clearly expressed in the statute:
In every relevant civil or criminal proceeding in which it is possible to do so
without violating the Federal Constitution, the common and statutory law of
Pennsylvania shall be construed so as to extend to the unborn the equal protec-
tion of the laws and to further the public policy of this Commonwealth encourag-
ing childbirth over abortion.
Id. § 3202(c).
79 The petitioners in Casey were five abortion clinics and a physician who repre-
sented a class of doctors who performed abortion services in the state. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), modified, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(plurality opinion). For the sake of clarity, this Article will describe the Casey peti-
tioners as "doctors" and the respondents as the "state" or the "government."
80 Id. at 705-06.
81 Id. at 705 ("This case involves commercial speech, and the clinics do not dispute
this point."). To support its conclusion, the court cited Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), which involved restrictions on attorney advertis-
ing, not doctor-patient conversations that occur after the formation of a fiduciary
relationship.
DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE
or unverifiable, and were reasonably related to the state's interest in
preventing consumer deception. 2 The Third Circuit reasoned that deny-
ing the state's power to impose these disclosure requirements upon physi-
cians threatened to uproot a large body of law requiring disclosures by
professionals and businesses.8 3
The Supreme Court plurality opinion,8 4 however, skirted a fully devel-
oped First Amendment analysis of the informed consent provisions.8 5
Instead, the Casey plurality's discussion of the statute's speech-related
aspects was based on an analysis of whether they "unduly burden" a
woman's privacy right to choose an abortion.86
Aside from the Third Circuit, no court has ever held that speech between doctors
and patients after the formation of a professional relationship is commercial speech.
Dicta in a Supreme Court case and the Court's commercial speech decisions strongly
suggest that the Third Circuit's characterization of doctor-patient speech as commer-
cial speech is mistaken. See infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
82 Casey, 947 F.2d at 704-05.
83 Id. at 706 n.19. The Third Circuit's fear that invalidation of the Pennsylvania
statute's informed consent provisions would require the invalidation of disclosure
requirements for "cigarette packages, advertisements and billboards," id., is unwar-
ranted because these measures are directed at a fundamentally different type of
speech. The Pennsylvania statute is targeted at speech within the confines of a doc-
tor-patient relationship, which is closely related to the discovery of truth and preserv-
ing patients' liberty. See infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text. Cigarette
packages, advertisements, and billboards, on the other hand, all involve advertising
that has a far more attenuated relationship to the discovery of truth and personal
liberty. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. Moreover, even within the
context of noncommercial, fiduciary relationships it is possible to differentiate
between governmental restrictions that subvert First Amendment values and those
that do not. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
84 The Casey plurality consisted of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (plurality opinion).
85 In the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the statute's informed consent
provisions violated physicians' First Amendment rights by forcing them "to convey
the state's message at the cost of violating their own conscientious beliefs and profes-
sional commitments." Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 53-55, Casey
(Nos. 91-744, 91-902). They did not argue that the provisions interfered with patients'
First Amendment right to receive information from their doctors, thus ignoring the
audience-based concerns of the First Amendment. See discussion infra part V. The
organizations representing health care providers failed to make any First Amendment
argument. See Brief for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Casey (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
None of the separate opinions in Casey that argued in favor of upholding the
informed consent provisions mentioned the Third Circuit's conclusion that doctor-
patient discourse is commercial speech. This suggests that these Justices did not agree
with the conclusion, because adoption of this ruling would have provided a ready
means of upholding the restrictions under the more lenient standard applicable to
restrictions on commercial speech. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
86 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
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The plurality concluded that the speech-related provisions did not vio-
late the First Amendment, and expressly overruled portions of City of
Akron and Thornburgh that held that government may not use doctor-
patient conversation as an instrument for expressing a viewpoint or for
persuading patients to opt for a governmentally preferred course of
action:
[W]e depart from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the
extent that we permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protect-
ing the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a
decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the
State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.87
Thus, the plurality held that government may promote its viewpoint by
imposing content regulations on all doctor-patient speech, not just speech
that occurs in a publicly funded setting.
The plurality also expressly rejected the holdings in both Akron and
Thornburgh that the state may not compel physicians to make statements
to patients that are unrelated to their particular health needs and inter-
ests.88 Moreover, the plurality explicitly endorsed the power of the State
to require physicians to make statements to patients about how their
medical decision could affect third parties.8 9
While the plurality acknowledged that the challenged regulations
implicated physicians' speech rights,9" they summarily dismissed this con-
cern, stating that advising patients is merely a "part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State."9'
Thus, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter grounded the newly rec-
87 Id. at 2824.
88 Id. at 2823 ("We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to
inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the
consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to
her health.").
89 Id. As an example, the plurality approved a state requirement that physicians
tell patients in need of a kidney transplant about the "risks to the donor as well as
risks to himself or herself." Id. For a discussion of the free speech implications of
regulations that require physicians to discuss the impact of a patient's medical deci-
sion upon third parties, see infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
90 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 ("All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted
First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks or
abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physi-
cian's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated.").
91 Id. The Court's reliance on Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), to support this
conclusion is misplaced. Whalen concerned a statute that required doctors to provide
the state of New York with the names of patients who received prescriptions for cer-
tain drugs. Id. at 591. Unlike Casey, Whalen did not involve a statute that directly
regulated the content of doctor-patient discourse. Such regulations involve a range of
free speech concerns, which are not implicated by requiring doctors to disclose
patients' names to the state. See discussion infra part IV.
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ognized power of government to impose viewpoint regulations on doctor-
patient speech in the states' police power to license and regulate
physicians.92
The plurality did not vest the state with an absolute power to dictate
the content of physicians statements to patients by compelling physician
speech. Regulations are unconstitutional, according to the plurality, if
they require physicians to make statements to patients that are false or
misleading.93
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas,
endorsed the plurality's recognition of the government's power to compel
physician speech.94 According to the Chief Justice, the government may
compel'doctors to utter any information that is both rationally related to
a legitimate state interest and "relevant," which he defines as information
that may "create some uncertainty and persuade. '95 As such, this pro-
posed due process-based standard for assessing governmental regulation
of the content of doctor-patient discourse is less stringent than the First
92 The plurality also upheld a provision of the statute that requires physicians, as
opposed to nonphysicians, to deliver the mandated information to patients. Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2824-25. In City of Akron, this requirement was deemed unconstitu-
tional. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 448
(1983). The Casey plurality, however, overruled this portion of City of Akron, again
on the basis of the state's power to license and regulate physicians. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2824 ("[Tlhe Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular
functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective
assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.").
93 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
94 Id. at 2867-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus,
taken together, the separate opinions in Casey reveal that seven Justices adhere to
this view. Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly dissented from the other Justices'
endorsement of the principle that government may impose viewpoint-based restric-
tions upon the content of doctor-patient speech. Justice Stevens expressed concern
that compelling persuasive speech by physicians may be unduly influential because of
patients' heightened vulnerability when faced with a momentous medical decision and
procedure. Id. at 2840 (Steven, J., dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun's dissent
focused on the danger of indoctrination when government is permitted to compel
physicians to express ideological messages during discussions with patients. Accord-
ing to Justice Blackmun, the plurality authorizes the substitution of "state medicine"
for a doctor-patient dialogue driven by patients' needs and interests. Id. at 2850
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
95 Id. at 2868 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not address petitioner's First Amendment claim, but instead
based his reasoning and conclusions solely on right-to-privacy jurisprudence. He
argued that abortion is a liberty interest protected, if at all, by the Due Process
Clause; however, he would subject such state regulation of such interests to a mere"rational basis" standard of review. Id. at 2867.
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Amendment standard applicable to commercial speech.96 Regulation of
commercial speech, which has a far more attenuated relationship to free
speech values, 7 must be based on a substantial government interest and
be "no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest., 98
II. CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS OF DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE
The various opinions in Rust and Casey reveal that a majority of the
Rehnquist Court adheres to the view that the First Amendment does not
prohibit the government from attempting to influence patients' medical
decision making through regulation of the content of doctor-patient dis-
course occurring in either a private or public setting. Under Rust, the
right to make funding decisions empowers the government to prevent
publicly funded physicians from discussing certain medical procedures, as
long as patients cannot reasonably expect to receive complete medical
advice and physicians are permitted to distance themselves from the
state's message.99 Under Casey, the authority to license and regulate the
practice of medicine empowers states to compel publicly and privately
financed physicians to make viewpoint-based statements to patients, as
long as those statements further a legitimate state interest and are not
false or misleading. 100
The Court's recognition of a governmental power to restrict doctor-
patient speech is diametrically opposed to the bedrock First Amendment
principle that speech regulations may not "favor some viewpoints or
ideas at the expense of others,"' 0'1 unless they are aimed at "low value"
communication such as obscenity or "fighting words."'0 2 Despite recent
unequivocal reaffirmations of this principle in other contexts, 10 3 the
96 Chief Justice Rehnquist has previously indicated that he views doctor-patient
discourse about medical procedures to be no more than a commercial transaction.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A trans-
action resulting in an operation such as [an abortion] is not 'private' in the ordinary
usage of that word.").
97 See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
98 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (citing
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
99 See supra notes 29-69 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
'o Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984). This First Amendment principle against viewpoint-based regulation of speech
is partially rooted in the audience-based concern that the public's consideration of
issues will be skewed if government is permitted to throw its weight behind one posi-
tion. See infra notes 248-84 and accompanying text.
102 See TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-18, at 928-29.
103 See, e.g, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (holding that
statute imposing criminal penalties on hate speech violates First Amendment's ban on
viewpoint discrimination); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
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Rehnquist Court abandoned it in the context of content regulations
directed at doctor-patient speech. While one suspects that the Court's
conclusions in these cases reflect the majority's views on the highly vola-
tile subject of abortion, the Court did not limit its holdings to this narrow
context. Instead, by basing its validation of speech restrictions on the
government's power to make funding decisions and to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine, the Court vested the state with broad authority to regu-
late the content of doctor-patient discourse about any medical subject.
The Court's approval of content restrictions on physician speech rests
upon several flaws in its analysis of the regulations at issue in Rust and
Casey. The most fundamental of these flaws is that the Court approaches
its analysis of government restrictions on the content of doctor-patient
discourse exclusively from the standpoint of their interference with physi-
cians' right to speak."°4 The Court ignores that the regulation of physi-
cian speech also impacts on patients' receipt of medical information. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, upon which the Rust Court based its
analysis, balances the government's need to make funding decisions
against the constitutional rights of government agents and employees
while performing official duties.0 5 The doctrine does not address the
impact that funding restrictions may have on the First Amendment rights
of listeners who depend upon publicly financed speakers for informa-
Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991) (finding that statute requiring that
accused or convicted criminals' income from publication of books or other work
describing crime be deposited in escrow fund for victims violates First Amendment's
prohibition against content restrictions).
104 The Court's tendency to focus on the rights of physicians and to ignore the
rights of patients has plagued its decisions concerning reproductive rights. For discus-
sions of this problem, see Susan F. Appleton, More Thoughts on the Physician's Con-
stitutional Role in Abortion and Related Choices, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 499, 499 (1988)
(arguing that the Court's focus in abortion cases on physician's rights stems from sex-
based discrimination, as evidenced by "laws that single out ... female patients for
different and often paternalistic treatment"); Susan F. Appleton, Doctors, Patients
and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role in Private Repro-
ductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 226 (1985) (arguing that the Court's focus
on the physician as the decision maker in the abortion context has eclipsed analysis of
the female patient's rights); Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in
Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 51, 102 (1983) (arguing that by characterizing abortion as a
fundamentally medical decision, the courts have reaffirmed the dominant role of the
typically male physician and eroded the rights of the female patient); Mary A. Wood
& Cole Durham, Jr., Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 783, 845 (arguing for implementation of
greater avenues for doctor counseling and patient consent as a means of enhancing
the genuine exercise of female patients' autonomy).
105 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991).
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tion. °6 The Rust Court's reliance on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, rather than on the First Amendment rights of patients, leads it
to overlook the danger that restrictions on the speech of publicly funded
physicians pose to patients' audience-based interests.1" 7
The Court's analysis of the speech restrictions at issue in Casey is simi-
larly physician-focused. Compelling physician speech, like silencing it,
implicates both doctors' right to speak and patients' right to receive infor-
mation. Yet, the plurality and the Rehnquist opinions acknowledged only
that Pennsylvania's informed consent provisions implicate physicians'
First Amendment right not to speak,1"8 and ignore patients' audience-
based interest in receiving information from their physicians. Thus, the
Court characterized and decided the case as if it involved a bipartite con-
flict between physicians' right to speak and states' right to regulate pro-
fessionals, rather than a tripartite conflict among physicians' speech
rights, government's power to regulate professionals, and patients' audi-
ence-based right to receive information. 0 9
106 For an excellent general discussion of the inadequacy of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions as a theory for analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on
the speech of publicly funded speakers, see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 675,701 (1992) ("In both its scholarly and judicial forms, however, the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine fails to address the audience-related concerns raised by
selective funding of speech.").
107 The term "audience-based" refers to the receptive, rather than the expressive,
aspect of communication, and focuses on the value of speech to the listener, rather
than the speaker. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories
of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519, 527 (1979) ("The central audience interest in
expression, then, is the interest in having a good environment for the formation of
one's beliefs and desires.").108 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824 (1992) (plurality opinion).
109 Justice White's concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985), a
case involving government regulations that mandated professionals' speech, is simi-
larly inattentive to the independent audience-based interests of clients. In Lowe, the
SEC sought to enjoin the petitioner, whose SEC registration as an investment advisor
was revoked after he was convicted of misappropriating client funds, from violating its
order and the statute's registration requirement by publishing a newsletter containing
investment advice. Id. at 184-85. The petitioner argued that the registration require-
ment violated the First Amendment. Id. at 189. The majority ruled in favor of the
petitioner on statutory, not constitutional, grounds. Id. at 211.
Although Justice White concurred in the judgment, in a separate opinion he argued
that the statute's registration and disclosure requirements violated the First Amend-
ment. Id. (White, J., concurring). According to Justice White, the case involved "a
collision between the power of government to license and regulate those who would
pursue a profession or vocation and the rights of freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id. at 228. To resolve such cases, Justice White
offered a simple solution. Under its power to regulate the professions, government
may legitimately regulate the professional's speech if a professional-client relationship
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The Court's single-minded focus in Rust and Casey on physicians'
rights blinds it to the chief threat that viewpoint-based regulation of doc-
tor-patient discourse poses to the Constitution in general and the First
Amendment in particular. Because the purpose of such restrictions is to
influence individual medical choices by restricting access to information
or promoting a biased understanding of available options, the restrictions
distort the decision-making process of patients. Just as viewpoint-based
regulation of the content of political speech distorts political decision
making and infringes on citizens' constitutional right to determine their
political destiny, 110 viewpoint-based regulation of medical speech distorts
medical decision making, and thus infringes on patients' constitutional
right to determine the destiny of their bodies."'
exists. However, if this relationship does not exist, any government restrictions upon
professional speech implicate the First Amendment. Id. at 232. In his analysis, Jus-
tice White mistakenly assumed that the government's interest in regulating profes-
sional speech will always be identical to the interests of listeners. He ignored the
possibility that government regulation of professional speech implicates the independ-
ent audience-based rights of clients and raises the spectre of government indoctrina-
tion. Despite its legitimate interest in protecting clients from unscrupulous
professionals, government certainly cannot be given carte blanche to force doctors,
lawyers, or investment advisors to become mouthpieces for state ideology and foot
soldiers in a campaign of indoctrination.
11o See Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Lim-
its of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 579 (1980) ("[A] characteristic distin-
guishing democratic from totalitarian government is that while a democracy attempts
to facilitate and ascertain public opinion and establish policy in accordance therewith,
an autocracy attempts to engineer public opinion in support of its decisions." (foot-
note omitted)). For an interesting examination of government distortion of communi-
cation and its relationship to political legitimacy, see CLAUS MUELLER, THE POLITICS
OF COMMUNICATION: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE,
SOCIALIZATION, AND LEGITIMATION 178 (1973) (arguing that distorted communica-
tion thwarts the public's critical examination of the rationales used by the state to
legitimate its system and policies).
"I Patients' right to control their medical treatment is rooted in the Constitution.
See Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."). It also stems in part from the
doctrine of informed consent. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 (D.C. Cir.)
("The root premise [in the doctrine of informed consent] is the concept, fundamental
in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.... .'" (quoting
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914))), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). The right is also embodied in the common law of battery. See Mohr
v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (holding defendant doctor liable for operat-
ing on a part of patient's body without her prior consent, on the ground that such
operation constitutes assault and battery).
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The Court's neglect of these audience-based concerns led it to formu-
late standards for judging the constitutionality of content restrictions on
doctor-patient speech that do not protect patients. Under Rust, restric-
tions on publicly funded physicians are unconstitutional only if patients
have an "all-encompassing" relationship with their doctor that gives rise
to a reasonable expectation of receiving comprehensive medical
advice." 2 This implies that publicly funded specialists, such as those who
are reimbursed by Medicaid and Medicare, could be silenced from speak-
ing to patients about a particular medical procedure." 3 Additionally, as
several commentators have noted, Rust has grave implications for the
quality of doctor-patient discourse under a reformed health care system
that is more dependent upon public funds than the current system.1 14
Under Rust, government may not impose viewpoint-based restrictions
that do not afford publicly financed physicians the opportunity to dis-
tance themselves from the state's message. However, while the opportu-
nity for physicians to disclaim agreement with state-dictated silence may
be sufficient to protect their First Amendment rights," 5 it is not sufficient
to safeguard patients' audience-based interests. Although physicians may
distance themselves by uttering disclaimers, they are not likely to do so if
112 See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (finding that because doctor-
patient relationships at issue were limited to prenatal care, patients had limited
expectations).
113 As a consequence, access to information about specific medical procedures
would be denied to population groups that historically have been denied access to
equal participation in American life, such as recipients of Medicaid-who are typi-
cally poor and disproportionately people of color-and recipients of Medicare-who
are elderly. For a discussion of the harmful impact of Rust on the availability of
reproductive health information to women of color, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v.
Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 590 (1993) ("By
promoting ignorance among these women, the [Rust] Court erected one more layer of
the 'structural entrapment' that keeps poor Black women at society's margins.").
114 George J. Annas, Restricting Doctor-Patient Conversations in Federally Funded
Clinics, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362, 364 (1991) (arguing that under a national health
insurance system, the Rust principle could be applied more broadly); Wendy K. Mar-
riner, Mum's the Word: The Supreme Court and Family Planning, 82 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 296, 300 (1992) (noting that the increase in the number of federally funded
clinics allows the Rust principle to be widely applied).
115 There is authority, however, for the proposition that the opportunity to dis-
claim agreement with a restriction may not even be sufficient to protect physicians'
First Amendment rights. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (stating that a "forced response is antithetical to the free discussion
that the First Amendment seeks to foster"); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 241 (1974) (holding that a forced right of reply violates newspaper's
right to be free from forced dissemination of views it would not voluntarily dissemi-
nate). But see Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980) (holding
that availability of effective disclaimer was sufficient to eliminate infringement upon
negative free speech rights).
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they agree with the government's position about a particular treatment.
In the case of compelled silence, the patients of these physicians will be
deprived of governmentally disfavored information without notice that
they are receiving only partial information and advice. In the case of
compelled speech, these patients will hear a biased message intended to
steer them toward the government's preferred course of treatment, with
no knowledge that the message stems from state opinion rather than from
their physician's best medical judgment."16
The Court's standards for judging the constitutionality of enactments
that compel speech by publicly and privately funded physicians also fail
to address or protect patients' audience-based interest in receiving medi-
cal information. Under Casey, the state may require both publicly and
privately funded physicians to make viewpoint-based statements to
patients as long as the statements are not false, misleading, or unrelated
to a legitimate state interest. 117 The Court thus vests the state with the
right to determine medical truth and falsity, even though the First
Amendment vests the people, not the state, with the right to determine
truth and falsity for themselves." 8
116 The Supreme Court's misplaced reliance on disclaimers has appeared in other
contexts as well. In Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 471 (1987), the Court considered
the constitutionality of a section of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22
U.S.C. §§ 611-621, which required disseminators of materials broadly defined as"political propaganda" to display a label disclosing certain information to the audi-
ence. An attorney who wanted to exhibit three Canadian films about acid rain and
nuclear war, but did not want to be regarded by the public as a foreign propagandist,
argued that the disclosure requirements violated the First Amendment. The Court
found that the disclosure requirements actually fostered the First Amendment
because the statute did not prevent distributors such as the attorney from counteract-
ing any bias generated by the government-mandated label by explaining before, dur-
ing, and after the film that it ought not to be discounted because the government had
deemed it "political propaganda." Id. at 477-85. The Court's reasoning, which relied
upon the traditional antidote of "more speech," reflects the same inattentiveness to
the danger of listener coercion that plagued its decisions in Rust and Casey. Specifi-
cally, the Court did not acknowledge that whenever government compels speakers to
utter its message there is a heightened risk of bias and coercion because the state's
weight and authority are thrown behind one idea and not others. The risk of coercion
is even greater when government-mandated statements denigrate or stigmatize a com-
peting position. The speaker compelled to make the officially sanctioned statement
may immediately utter a negation. However, this may not be sufficient to counteract
the persuasive effect of the government's statement, derived from the mere fact that it
is backed by the state's power and authority. Similarly, a physician's disclaimer of
agreement with a mandated expression of government opinion may be insufficient to
counteract its coercive effect on patients.
117 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
118 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978) ("[T]he people in our
democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the rela-
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Moreover, the categories of "truth" and "falsity" do not capture a
range of statements that, while "true," threaten to undermine patients'
autonomous decision making. For example, bald viewpoint-based asser-
tions to patients such as "the State believes that you should not undergo a
heart bypass operation," or "the federal government believes that you
should agree to donate your organs" would be permitted under Casey
because they are not false and are, arguably, reasonably related to a legit-
imate state interest."19 Yet, when uttered by a physician in the context of
a doctor-patient relationship, these statements can be coercive. 20 Addi-
tionally, an inquiry limited to determining truth or falsity also would not
prevent government from forcing physicians to make statements that are
plainly intended to capitalize on patients' fear and vulnerability within
the structure of the doctor-patient relationship. 2
Furthermore, the concepts of objective truth and falsity are inappropri-
ate standards for judging the constitutionality of compelled speech within
the context of relationships between professionals and their patient/cli-
ents, because those concepts deny the fundamentally subjective nature of
these affiliations. Patient/clients form professional relationships because
they lack the information needed to make a rational decision on their
own about a problem that is within the professional's area of expertise.
The goal of this relationship is to identify the patient/client's particular
needs and interests and to obtain expert advice about the most appropri-
ate course of action. The forced assertion by the state of information that
is objectively true but unduly persuasive to the patient/client, or unmind-
tive merits of conflicting arguments."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)
(Jackson, J., concurring):
But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the
public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to
foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind
through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must
be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any govern-
ment to separate the true from the false for us.
119 Since states have a broad range of interests in many aspects of health care
delivery-from monitoring the quality of care to protecting against consumer fraud-
it is difficult to conceive of a regulation that could not be linked to a legitimate state
interest. For example, a state could justify a requirement that physicians dissuade
patients from undergoing coronary bypass surgery on the ground that it is more
expensive than other options. The government also could justify a requirement that
physicians urge patients to donate their organs on the ground that it is necessary to
increase the supply of available organs.
120 See infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
121 For example, this standard would not prevent government from compelling
physicians to describe certain procedures in especially gory, but accurate, detail as a
way to steer patients toward a governmentally preferred course of treatment.
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ful of his or her particular needs and interests, is antithetical to this goal
and threatens to undermine the purpose of the relationship. 122
The other central problem with the Court's analysis of the content
restrictions at issue in Rust and Casey is that it implicitly relies upon a
dubious model of doctor-patient interaction. The Court assumes that
patients will respond to physician expressions of state policy rationally
and critically, and that they will not be unduly influenced or confused.
According to the Court's vision, as a matter of course patients will simply
question physicians who fail to distance themselves from a governmen-
tally dictated message to determine if their advice or silence is an expres-
sion of professional judgement or of state policy. Likewise, when
physicians verbally distance themselves from state-imposed messages,
patients will accept their disclaimers at face value and be unaffected by
the apparent dissonance between the views of the doctor and the state.
The Court's assumptions about how patients will respond to and be
affected by state messages conveyed by physicians are in conflict with a
large body of research into the dynamics of doctor-patient communica-
tion. 2 ' As this research shows, the purpose and structure of the doctor-
patient relationship vest physicians with immense authority and power in
the eyes of patients.'24 Physicians' authority derives from their superior
122 Of course, under certain circumstances, government regulation is needed to
protect clients from fiduciaries' over-reaching and nondisclosure. See George J. Ben-
ston, Government Constraints on Political, Artistic, and Commercial Speech, 20 CONN.
L. REV. 303, 321 (1988):
[I]f one accepts the notion that speech should not be constrained because those
who would do the restricting do not know the "truth," then society can justify
restrictions on advice-giving only when it can show that the receiver cannot dis-
tinguish between beneficial and harmful speech or when the net negative exter-
nalities are overwhelmingly great.
123 The literature on doctor-patient communication is vast. See, e.g., DOCTOR-
PATIENT COMMUNICATION (1983) (David Pendleton & John Hasler eds., 1983); ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE
(1970); KATZ, supra note 28; ELIOT G. MISHLER, SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF HEALTH,
ILLNESS AND PATIENT CARE (1981); TALCOTF PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951);
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DOCTOR-PATIENT COMMUNICATION (Sue Fisher &
Alexandra D. Todd eds., 1983) [hereinafter SOCIAL ORGANIZATION]; see also Doug-
las W. Maynard, Interaction and Asymmetry in Clinical Discourse, 97 AM. J. Soc. 448
(1991); Howard Waitzkin, A Critical Theory of Medical Discourse: Ideology, Social
Control, and the Processing of Social Context in Medical Encounters, 30 J. HEALTH &
Soc. BEHAV. 220 (1989).
124 Maynard, supra note 123, at 448 (stating that studies of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship uniformly describe "an asymmetry of knowledge and authority that allows
doctors to promulgate a biomedical model of disease and to simultaneously under-
mine patients' own experience and understanding").
Researchers have used several theoretical constructs to describe the asymmetry
between doctor and patient. A number of scholars have analogized the relationship
between a doctor and patient to that between a parent and child. See, e.g., KATZ,
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knowledge and education, 125 their prestigious social and economic sta-
tus, 126 and the "charismatic authority" that derives from their symbolic
role as conquerors of disease and death. 27 As one researcher writes,
"[p]atients are aware that medicine deals with powerful forces not com-
pletely amenable to reason. Life and death are arbitrary, so it is not sur-
prising that doctors are invested with the ability to relieve suffering and
fear by means that are not strictly scientific or even rational., 1 28 The
confluence of these factors leads to an institutionalization of physicians'"professional dominance" within the structure of doctor-patient interac-
tion that in itself legitimizes physician expressions. 129
In the face of this dominance, patients suspend their critical faculties
and defer to physicians' opinions.130 Patients' disempowered position
supra note 28, at 143 (observing that when persons are ill and beset by fears and
anxiety, "infantile hopes and fears surface most insistently.... Patients' hopes that
they have finally found an all-comforting parent-caretaker who will relieve all suffer-
ing spring eternal."); Leonard L. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for Action, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 580, 597 (stating that a sick patient tends to "regress into a childlike state
and enter into a transference relationship with his physician whom he thrusts into the
role of a parent"). Others have noted its similarity to the relationship between the
priest and believer. See, e.g., Howard Brody, The Symbolic Power of the Modern
Personal Physician: The Placebo Response Under Challenge, 18 J. DRUG ISSUES 149,
153 (1988) (arguing that the modern physician "shares with the priest the role of
bridge between the impersonal, transcendental powers of the universe and the con-
crete humanity of the patient").
125 See KATZ, supra note 28, at 88 (noting that physicians' esoteric knowledge sup-
ports their insistence on "complete authority over their patients' medical needs");
PARSONS, supra note 123, at 463 ("[T]he physician is a technically competent person
whose competence and specific judgments and measures cannot be competently
judged by the layman.").
126 FREIDSON, supra note 123, at 113-14 ("[Tlhe patient may grant deference to the
physician because the physician is of an upper middle-class background and is a mem-
ber of an old, honorable, and superlatively prestigious profession.").
127 Id. at 15 ("[T]he physician is the symbol of healing whose authority takes pre-
cedence over all others.").
128 Peter Tate, Doctors' Style, in DOCTOR-PATIENT COMMUNICATION, supra note
123, at 78.
129 FREIDSON, supra note 123, at 119-20. ("A professional's advice should be
obeyed because it is a professional who gives it, not because the advice is or can be
evaluated on its evidential merits.").
130 Id. at 113 (explaining that the authority associated with physicians may cause
the patient to "swallow his anxiety and restrain his demands, feeling that the physi-
cian is too important to be bothered by the trivial or that he is too busy to be expected
to explain"); KATZ, supra note 28, at 124 (explaining that "illness-including the fears
and hopes it engenders, the ignorance in which it is embedded, the realistic and
unrealistic expectations it mobilizes-can contribute to tilting the balance in patients
and physicians further toward irrationality and choices that, on reflection, both might
wish to reconsider").
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stems from a number of factors, including lack of medical knowledge,''
the anxiety that accompanies illness, and the need to believe that physi-
cians have the power and competence needed to cure them.
Patients' lack of power within the structure of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship leads to passivity and a reluctance to question or challenge physi-
cians."x 2 A large body of research has demonstrated that patients rarely
ask questions during conversations with physicians or take control of top-
ics that are discussed.13 3 Patients typically ask only one to four questions
during an encounter with a physician.13 1 One study of interaction
between adult patients and their long-term general practitioners found
that patients initiated fewer than one percent of the total utterances dur-
ing medical interviews. 13 The same study also revealed that patients fre-
quently preface their questions to physicians with either a request for
permission to ask a question, or notice that a question is about to be
asked.'3 6 When patients do marshal the courage to seek information,
131 SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
MEDICAL DECISIONS 46 (1990) ("Patients enter medical interactions from a position
of relative weakness.... They enter unfamiliar surroundings in which all of the other
participants seem to share a common language. This language is, for the most part,
unintelligible and frightening to them."); see FREIDSON, supra note 123, at 109 ("[L]ay
clients do not necessarily share the professional's universe of discourse. Indeed, lay
clients are by definition lacking in the educational or experiential prerequisites that
would allow them to decide, on grounds shared with the professional, whether to
accept any particular piece of professional advice.").
132 FREIDSON, supra note 123, at 114.
133 See, e.g., Analee Beisecker & Thomas Beisecker, Patient Information-Seeking
Behaviors When Communicating with Doctors, 28 MED. CARE 19, 27 (1990) (finding
that patients rarely ask questions of physicians); Debra L. Roter, Patient Participation
in the Patient-Provider Interaction: The Effects of Patient Question Asking on the
Quality of Interaction, Satisfaction, and Compliance, 5 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS
281, 283 (1977) (stating that most patients, particularly in clinics, are "passive and
powerless" in their interaction with physicians, and rarely ask questions or volunteer
information that is not specifically requested); Wesley Sharrock, Portraying the Pro-
fessional Relationship, in HEALTH EDUCATION IN PRACTICE 125, 143 (Digby C.
Anderson ed., 1979) (stating that patients feel constrained from asking their doctors
questions); Candace West, "Ask Me No Questions...": An Analysis of Queries and
Replies in Physician-Patient Dialogues, in SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 123, at
76 (stating that patient-initiated utterances to physicians tend to be "anything but
questions").
134 Debra L. Roter, Patient Question Asking in Physician-Patient Interaction, 3
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 395, 405 (1984) (citing studies reporting the frequency of patient
questions).
135 Richard Frankel, Talking in Interviews: A Dispreference for Patient-Initiated
Questions in Physician-Patient Encounters, in INTERACTION COMPETENCE 231, 239
(George Psathas ed., 1990) (finding that patients initiated only 30 of 3517 utterances
during 10 medical interviews).
136 Id. at 240-41.
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they may be misunderstood 13 7 or ignored by physicians who perceive a
threat to their professional dominance:3 8
The client, lacking professional training, is thought to be unequipped
for intelligent evaluation or informed cooperation with his consult-
ant. Essentially, he is expected either to have faith in his consultant
and do what he is told without question or else to choose another
consultant in whom he does have faith.13 9
These structural inequities also counteract patients' ability to question
physicians and redirect the course of a conversation, even if patients have
an acute desire to acquire information. 40 Moreover, socio-economic dif-
ferences between doctor and patient,' 4 1 particularly differences of
race, 42 class, 43 gender,4 or age, 45 further impede communication.
137 Patients often have difficulty formulating questions that match their concerns
because they are anxious and lack scientific language. See MISHLER, supra note 123,
at 110 (describing a study that found that patients often strain to speak in "medical"
language, usually unsuccessfully, and then revert to their own language, "which may
even have become more vague or 'regressed' as a result of the failure of expression");
West, supra note 133, at 96-97 (finding that 50% of questions asked by patients evi-
denced "speech disturbances," such as stuttering and repeated self-correction).
1as See MARIE HAUG & BEBE LAVIN, CONSUMERISM IN MEDICINE: CHALLENGING
PHYSICIANS' AUTHORITY 75-76 (1983) (finding that only 35% of physicians studied
accept patients' right to read their own medical records); Diana Shye et al., Patient
Initiatives and Physician-Challenging Behaviors: The Views of Israeli Health Profes-
sionals, 31 SOC. SCI. & MED. 719, 725 (1990) (stating that the Israeli physicians stud-
ied "do not take a positive view of patient behaviors which express independence and
initiative in the doctor-patient interaction"); Howard Waitzkin, Medicine, Superstruc-
ture and Micropolitics, 13A Soc. SCI. & MED. 601, 606 (1979) (arguing that physicians
withhold medical information as a way to maintain patterns of dominance and subor-
dination within the doctor-patient relationship); Howard Waitzkin & John D. Stoe-
ckle, Information Control and the Micropolitics of Health Care: Summary of an
Ongoing Research Project, 10 SOC. SCI. & MED. 263, 264 (1976) (arguing that doctors
may withhold information as means of maintaining control over patients).
139 FREIDSON, supra note 123, at 142.
140 Beisecker & Beisecker, supra note 133, at 26 ("[P]atients' strong stated desire
for information about their medical condition did not prompt them to engage fre-
quently in information seeking behavior.").
"4l See Ronald D. Adelman et al., Issues in Physician-Elderly Patient Interaction,
11 AGEING AND SOCIETY 127, 133 (1991) (stating that when doctors' and patients'
sociodemographic characteristics match, communication may be facilitated).
142 See John M. Eisenberg, Sociologic Influences on Decision-Making By Clini-
cians, 90 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 957, 958 (1979) (collecting studies finding differ-
ences in treatment of black and white patients by doctors and hospitals); David R.
Levy, White Doctors and Black Patients: Influence of Race on the Doctor-Patient Rela-
tionship, 75 PEDIATRICS 639, 640 (1985) (stating that white doctors' unconscious
racism can impede the doctor-patient relationship).
143 See Eisenberg, supra note 142, at 958 (noting that "the bulk of the available
literature implies a significant relation between social class and decisions regarding
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The insights of social science into doctor-patient interaction strongly
indicate that the Supreme Court has overestimated the extent to which
patients' critical rationality and inquisitiveness will neutralize the coer-
cive effect of government messages that are delivered by physicians.
Patients are not likely to challenge physicians' governmentally dictated
silence or biased presentation of medical options. Rather, patients are
likely to give great weight to physicians' expressions of state preferences,
not because they are persuaded by the messages, but merely because the
messages are delivered by physicians. 146 The asymmetrical, highly emo-
patient management); Arnold M. Epstein et al., Effects of Patients' Socioeconomic
Status and Physicians' Training and Practice on Patient-Doctor Communication, 78 J.
MED. 101, 104 (1985) (finding that "patients from lower socioeconomic groups tended
to agree less often with their doctors about basic aspects of their medical care than did
patients from higher socioeconomic groups"); David A. Pendleton & Stephen
Bochner, The Communication of Medical Information in General Practice Consulta-
tions as a Function of Patients' Social Class, 14A Soc. ScI. & MED. 669, 671 (1980)
(finding that patients' social class is a significant predictor of how many explanations,
either volunteered or in answer to questions, they receive from doctors); Howard
Waitzkin, Doctor-Patient Communication: Clinical Implications of Social Scientific
Research, 252 JAMA 2441, 2442, 2443 (1984) [hereinafter Waitzkin, Doctor-Patient
Communication] (finding that "[p]atients from upper- or upper-middle-class positions
received more doctor time, [and] more total explanations" than did patients of lower
socioeconomic status, and that "[d]octors who come from an upper- or upper-middle-
class background tended to spend more time informing their patients, [and] gave
more explanations" than did doctors of lower- or lower-middle-class backgrounds);
Howard Waitzkin, Information Giving in Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV.
81, 98 (1985) (concluding that class differences in language use between doctor and
patient pose significant barriers to communication and exchange of information).
144 See ALEXANDRA D. TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT
BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 33-35 (1989) (noting studies that have
found that doctors take female patients less seriously, and condescend to them more
than to male patients); CANDACE WEST, ROUTINE COMPLICATIONS: TROUBLES WITH
TALK BETWEEN DOCTORS AND PATIENTS 24 (1984) (discussing studies that indicate
that doctors tend to underestimate patients' knowledge of medical terms, and that
male doctors are more likely to make such a mistake when the patients are female).
But see Elizabeth M. Hooper et al., Patient Characteristics That Influence Physician
Behavior, 20 MED. CARE 630, 633 (1982) (finding that physicians were more
empathetic toward, and gave more information to, female patients); Waitzkin, Doc-
tor-Patient Communication, supra note 143, at 2442 (finding that women received
more time and more information from doctors).
145 See Adelman et al., supra note 141, at 142 (stating that physicians were more
abrupt, condescending, and indifferent with older patients, who were less assertive
than younger patients).
146 In drafting the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which seeks to promote organ
donation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws seems
to-have recognized that physicians may unduly influence patients. The statute does
not compel physicians to discuss organ donation with patients or family members.
Instead, it states that this discussion should be initiated by a hospital administrator, or
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tional quality of doctor-patient interaction makes it probable that
patients-particularly those who are nonwhite, poor, elderly, or female-
will be intimidated by physician expressions of the state's viewpoint and
respond with confusion and deference.
Furthermore, the Court's reliance upon physician disclaimers to
prevent patient coercion is also misplaced. Physicians' nonverbal
messages 147 are as important, and may even be more important, than
their verbal expressions. 14  Patients' heightened sensitivity to nonverbal
communication may render ineffective their physician's oral disclaimers.
It is curious that the Rehnquist Court failed to recognize the substan-
tial risk of undue influence from governmentally dictated, viewpoint-
based messages delivered by physicians. The doctrine of informed con-
sent, in effect in most states, was developed to counteract the phenome-
non of professional dominance and institutionalized deference by
increasing the flow of information to patients to both decrease the imbal-
ance in knowledge and power and protect patients from physician coer-
cion. 49 Apparently, however, the Rehnquist Court failed to see that the
qualities of doctor-patient interaction that increase the risk of coercion by
a person designated by the hospital, after receiving the consent of the patient's physi-
cian. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACr § 5(a)-(b), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1987).
147 Nonverbal messages involve
subtle cues which complement and illustrate aspects of the verbal interaction and
often provide messages and express feelings that are not subject to direct con-
scious analysis by the interactants. A patient's grimace, smile, or expression of
fear, as well as a nurse's comforting touch or facial expression of disgust, are
communicative acts which may be even more important than the matter under
verbal discussion.
Howard S. Friedman, Nonverbal Communication Between Patients and Medical Prac-
titioners, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 82, 83 (1979).
148 See DOCTOR-PATIENT COMMUNICATION, supra note 123, at 21 (stating that
patients are highly attentive to doctors' nonverbal behavior for cues about how they
ought to behave); Friedman, supra note 147, at 95 (observing that sensitivity to non-
verbal messages is great among the ill, "who are also seeking factual information
about the nature and severity of their illness and social comparison information as to
what they should be feeling in a time of emotional uncertainty. So even the slightest
inconsistency [between verbal and nonverbal cues] is unlikely to go unnoticed.");
MISHLER, supra note 123, at 117 ("Clinical observation and more recent research sug-
gests that much communication, especially of feelings, between doctor and patient
occurs through nonverbal channels.").
149 See Richard E. Simpson, Note, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient
Participation in Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 172, 175 (1981)
("[Platient participation in medical decisionmaking is necessary to avert the danger
that physicians will exploit patients by subjecting them to treatment that is not in their
best interests.").
DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE
physicians also lead to a heightened risk of coercion by government when
physicians are deputized into ideological service."'
In sum, Rust and Casey acknowledge that content restrictions on doc-
tor-patient speech implicate the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
Yet in both cases, the Court did not engage in a systematic First Amend-
ment analysis of these restrictions. Instead, the Court myopically focused
on physicians' rights, neglecting patients' audience-based interests and
ignoring the likelihood that patients will respond with bewilderment and
deference to viewpoint-based messages that are delivered by physicians.
Moreover, the Court did not appreciate or address the most serious con-
stitutional problem posed by content restrictions on physician speech:
They enable the government to promote its partisan views by stifling the
availability of medical information and distorting patients' decision-mak-
ing process. As such, content restrictions on doctor-patient discourse
raise traditional free speech concerns that must be analyzed under tradi-
tional First Amendment doctrine. This analysis requires a theory that
permits government regulations to maximize the opportunity for genuine
patient consent by increasing the flow of relevant, truthful information,
while at the same time preventing the state from enforcing its orthodoxy.
Such a theory must rest on First Amendment principles.
III. DOCTOR-PATIENT DISCOURSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment protects
only speech related to politics151 or "matters of public concern." '152 Most
150 This connection was not lost on Justice Blackmun, whose opinions were consist-
ently sensitive to the impact of the doctor-patient relationship upon patients' ability
to rationally assess the real or perceived opinions of their physicians:
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship of
trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress often
attendant to health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete
confidence, and often their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals. One
seeks a physician's aid not only for medication or diagnosis, but also for gui-
dance, professional judgment, and vital emotional support. Accordingly, each of
us attaches profound importance and authority to the words of advice spoken by
the physician.
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) ("Nothing in the First
Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the
adjective 'political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional
inquiry."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that
the free flow of [commercial] information does not serve that goal." (footnote omit-
ted)); id. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Ideological expression, be it oral, literary,
pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought-thought that
may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man."); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1948) ("Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
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frequently, the Court regards the constitutional guarantee of free speech
as an instrument to advance the discovery of truth by protecting a "mar-
ketplace of ideas" in which opinions compete with each other for public
acceptance. 153 As Thomas Emerson explains, "freedom of expression is
an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth. An
individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the ques-
tion, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposi-
tion, and make full use of different minds.' 15 4
In somewhat broader terms, the Court has also recognized that the
First Amendment safeguards individuals' thought processes and expres-
sion against government suppression. For example, the Court has stated
that the First Amendment protects speech related to the "intellect and
spirit,"' 55 individual self-expression' 56 and fulfillment,'57 and the "exposi-
tion of ideas."' 58
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.").
152 As several commentators have observed, the Supreme Court has not yet
extended the "matter of public concern" test beyond cases involving defamation and
public employment, even though several recent decisions suggest that it may be mov-
ing in this direction. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Con-
cern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 23-26 (1990) (assessing the potential reach of the public concern test in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions). However, even if the Court extends its use of the
"matter of public concern" test to other types of cases, its definition of what consti-
tutes public concern appears to be sufficiently broad to encompass doctor-patient dis-
course about diagnosis and treatment. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (finding that public utility's newsletter, with material
on energy-saving tips, wildlife conservation, billing information, and recipes, touched
on matters of public concern protected by the First Amendment).
153 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .... ").
154 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
5 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
531 (1945) ("The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as free-
dom of conscience.").
"I First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's
interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the
concern for open and informed discussion, although the two often converge.").
1'7 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("To permit the continued
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,
our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship.").
158 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
"fighting words" may constitutionally be restricted as they do not further any exposi-
tion of ideas); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)
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Most scholars reject the view that the First Amendment only protects
political speech 159 and the marketplace of ideas model.16  Instead, they
("[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artis-
tic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is
not entitled to full First Amendment protection."); Young v. American Mini Theaters,
427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the First Amendment fully
protects against regulation of the expression of social, political, or philosophical
messages); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Ideological expression... is integrally
related to the exposition of thought-thought that may shape our concepts of the
whole universe of man."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controver-
sial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full pro-
tection of the guaranties . . ").
159 Robert Bork and Alexander Meiklejohn are the chief proponents of the view
that the protection of political speech is the sole objective of the First Amendment,
although Meikeljohn's perspective has broadened over time. For their views, see
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22-27 (1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (analogizing the limits of Free
Speech protections to the town meeting); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("There is no basis for
judicial intervention to protect any . . . form of expression [other than political
speech], be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene of porno-
graphic."); Alexander Meikeljohn, The First Amendment Is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 256-267 (arguing for a broader conception of protected political speech,
including all thought and speech by which citizens govern).
For critics of this position, see Estlund, supra note 152, at 45 (contending that
Bork's view of the First Amendment would yield predictable results "at the cost of
excluding from protection almost all literature, art, science, history, discussion of the
economic system and the activities of powerful nongovernment persons and organiza-
tions, and much speech on matters of widespread public controversy that had yet to
coalesce into specific proposals for government intervention"); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 601 (1982) ("The mistake of Bork and
Meiklejohn, then, is that they have confused one means of obtaining the ultimate
value with the value itself.").
The case of government regulation of doctor-patient speech reveals the fallacy of
the position that the First Amendment only protects political speech. The freedom to
engage in unconstrained speech about politics would mean little in the lives of individ-
uals in a society in which the state dictated the content of doctor-patient conversa-
tions about the most intimate and life-altering decisions they make. See Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A society that tells its
doctors under pain of criminal penalty what they may not tell their patients is not a
free society.").
160 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-7
(1989) (claiming that marketplace theory is based on false assumptions that truth is
objective and people are rational); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 129 (1987) (arguing that women and members
of ethnic and racial minorities are silenced and denied equal access to modes of
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tend to view the purpose of the First Amendment as ensuring more than
the continued existence of a democratic political system or the free flow
of information needed to make rational public decisions. Amidst a wide
array of opinions about the specific values warranting First Amendment
protection, the predominant theory is that speech warrants protection
because it facilitates individual development and shields a sphere of per-
sonal liberty against government infiltration. 16
Proponents of a First Amendment theory that focuses on the relation-
ship between speech and personal liberty have articulated several specific
"free speech values" that deserve constitutional protection. In one view,
speech that fosters individual autonomy and self-determination must be
fully protected in order to maintain the integrity of the individual and
protect private decision making from undue government intrusion. 162 As
David Richards explains, "[tihe value of free expression ... rests on its
deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination
without which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish.' 161 Most propo-
expression); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987) (argu-
ing that the market "might be an effective institution for producing cheap and varied
consumer goods and for providing essential services ... but not for producing the
kind of debate that constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determina-
tion"); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 36-37 (concluding that the marketplace theory's assumption of equal access is
no longer defensible).
161 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978):
The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace
but rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental
restrictions. Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because
of the value of speech conduct to the individual. The liberty theory justifies pro-
tection because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual self-realiza-
tion and self-determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate
claims of others.
162 BAKER, supra note 160, at 24 (positing that "freedom of speech may be defensi-
ble, not because of the marketplace of ideas' supposed capacity to discover truth, but
because freedom of speech embodies respect for the liberty or autonomy and respon-
sibility of the participants"); Scanlon, Jr., supra note 107, at 531 (stating that "the
legitimate powers of government are limited to those that can be defended on
grounds compatible with the autonomy of its citizens"); David A.J. Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment," 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) ("Freedom of expression.., supports a mature individual's
sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others; it disfavors restric-
tions on communication imposed for the sake of the distorting rigidities of the ortho-
dox and the established.").
163 Richards, supra note 162, at 62.
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nents of this view agree that speech fostering individual self-realization'
and self-fulfillment'65 is fully protected by the First Amendment.
Under both the marketplace of ideas and the personal liberty models,
doctor-patient discourse constitutes speech that should be fully pro-
tected. 166 Doctor-patient discourse facilitates the discovery of two levels
of "truth" that warrant protection under the marketplace of ideas model.
First, a primary goal of doctor-patient discourse is to discover the"patient's truth"-the best course of medical treatment in light of that
patient's unique configuration of objective and subjective characteristics.
When a patient is diagnosed with an illness and must decide on a course
of treatment, the "marketplace of ideas" that informs his or her decision
making is provided mainly by physicians. 167 In conversations with physi-
cians, patients seek to discover the nature of the medical problem, its
possible causes, alternative treatments and their risks, and factors that
could affect whether a possible treatment will fail or succeed. 6 ' Patients'
discovery of their medical truth--, that is, of the particular course of treat-
"6 See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 167 (1990) (stating that the proper First Amendment focus would result in
protection of many values currently seen as tied to free speech analysis, including
dignity and cathartic values); Redish, supra note 159, at 593 (arguing that the guaran-
tee of free speech only promotes the value of "individual self-realization"); Thomas
M. Scanlon, Jr., A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 204,217-18
(1972) (noting that restrictions on free speech inhibit individual autonomy and judg-
ment); see also Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First
Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 75 (1989) (arguing that First Amend-
ment's protection of mental processes extends to the forced administration of psycho-
tropic drugs).
165 EMERSON, supra note 154, at 6 (arguing that freedom of expression is an
"essential" means of ensuring self-fulfillment).
166 This analysis relies on an idealized model of doctor-patient interaction. For an
examination of doctor-patient communication, see supra notes 123-45 and accompa-
nying text. It is, however, appropriate to consider expressive conduct in its ideal form
when determining its proper level of First Amendment protection. To do otherwise
would deny constitutional protection to forms of expressive conduct that, for one rea-
son or another, fail to achieve their communicative potential. A theatrical flop is no
less deserving of full First Amendment protection than a tour-de-force.
167 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.) ("[The patient's]
dependence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of
contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
168 Richard L. Street, Jr., Information-Giving in Medical Consultations: The Influ-
ence of Patients' Communicative Styles and Personal Characteristics, 32 Soc. ScI. &
MED. 541, 541 (1991) ("[F]or the patient, information fosters an understanding of
one's health status which in turn may reduce uncertainty, alleviate concerns, and
improve health.").
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ment that is best for them-depends on an unconstrained flow of infor-
mation from physicians. 169
Doctor-patient speech also advances the discovery of scientific and
medical truth. Through discussions, the physician gathers information in
order to diagnose and treat the patient. 7 ' Additionally, conversations
with numerous patients over time enhance doctors' scientific and medical
knowledge about diseases, medications, procedures, symptomology, diag-
noses, and the practice of medicine in general. 17 1 Thus, the marketplace
of ideas model of the First Amendment, focusing on the relationship
between access to information and the discovery of truth, supports the
full protection of doctor-patient discourse. 72
Doctor-patient speech also implicates a number of free speech values
that are central to personal liberty. When patients seek physicians'
advice for medical problems, the ensuing discourse consists of expres-
sions of fact, opinion, and persuasion. 17 Doctors impart scientific and
experiential information about disease and the benefits and risks of avail-
169 Similarly, restrictions on commercial speech have repeatedly been invalidated
on the grounds that they impede consumers' discovery of information. See, e.g., Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977) (stating that a ban on attorney advertising
"serves to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable
ability"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976) (concluding that a ban on advertising by pharmacists inter-
fered with consumers' ability to compare costs and exercise economic choice).
170 Street, Jr., supra note 168, at 541 (stating that gathering information is crucial
for the doctor's diagnosis and treatment of patients' problems).
171 Although the Supreme Court has not directly decided the question, there is a
consensus among scholars that the First Amendment protects scientific expression
and expressive conduct related to scientific experimentation. See, e.g., Richard Del-
gado et al., Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of Government
Restrictions, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128, 160 (1983) ("[Wlere the Court to address the
issue directly, it is highly probable that scientific expression would receive full protec-
tion under the first amendment.").
172 Free market theorists might also argue that the free flow of information
between doctor and patient facilitates a patient's ability to make rational economic
decisions about treatments and whether to retain the physician's services. Thus, in the
aggregate, protecting doctor-patient discourse enhances the efficiency of the market
for medical treatments and physicians' services.
173 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (holding that
the First Amendment protects speech that contains elements of commercial solicita-
tion and noncommercial persuasion); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1974)
(holding that the First Amendment applies to speech that "involve[s] the exercise of
the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion"); Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689
(1959) (stating that the Constitution "protects expression which is eloquent no less
than that which is unconvincing"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (stating
that the First Amendment protects the "opportunity to persuade to action, not merely
to describe facts").
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able treatments. Patients inquire about what they do not understand,
express their fears, and convey facts relevant to the doctor's assessment
of the likely success of different treatment alternatives. In this discourse,
doctors and patients also often discuss a wide range of subjects including
the patient's medical, psychological, family, and sexual histories; ethical
and religious beliefs; and any other factor that may affect the patient's
physical or mental well-being. 74 Additionally, patients commonly seek
physicians' advice for highly personal, nonmedical problems.'75 When it
works, the outcome of this discourse is a mutually determined treatment
decision that reflects the best judgment of the doctor and patient about
how to proceed.
Doctor-patient speech is essential to maintaining patients' auton-
omy,1 76 self-determination, 77 and dignity in the face of illness. In addi-
tion to determining treatment, another objective of doctor-patient
discourse is to democratize the medical decision-making process and
empower patients to participate actively in determining what happens to
their bodies. 17  There are few decisions that are as intimate, personal,
and life-defining as one about how to cope with a medical condition.
Information is a patient's only shield against fear and uncertainty, which
can reduce even powerful, educated, and self-assertive individuals to
174 See Adelman et al., supra note 141, at 127 ("[ELven in initial medical
encounters which involve the meeting of two strangers, patients and physicians deal
with concerns as diverse as life and death as well as other intimate or personal
issues.").
175 Lewis Thomas, On the Science and Technology of Medicine, in DOING BETTER
AND FEELING WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 42 (J.H. Knowles ed., 1977)
(reporting that a study found that 75% of all patient visits were for the purpose of
getting advice on family, economic, or social issues, or to get reassurance about physi-
cal symptoms).
176 David Cole persuasively argues that the close relationship between doctor-
patient discourse and individual autonomy justifies the creation of a "neutrality
exception" to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which permits government
to compel the expression of opinion within the boundaries of publicly funded pro-
grams. See Cole, supra note 106, at 743-47. Of course, patients of privately funded
physicians are no less dependent upon doctor-patient discourse to preserve their
autonomy than patients of publicly funded physicians. Therefore, Cole's argument in
favor of imposing a requirement of neutrality upon government-dictated speech by
physicians applies with equal force to both publicly and privately funded doctors.
177 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) ("True consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportu-
nity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon
each."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
178 See Simpson, supra note 149, at 174 ("The value of patient participation in
medical decisionmaking lies in its tendency to humanize the treatment process by
ensuring that the patient retains the status of an autonomous being, capable of assimi-
lating information and making decisions that affect his or her life.").
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quaking passivity.'79 Through candid discussions with their physicians,
patients are able to retain autonomy and control over their lives and their
bodies.
Doctor-patient speech also promotes patients' self-realization. A criti-
cal component of the medical decision-making process is the identifica-
tion and articulation of patients' values, personal strengths, and
weaknesses. In deciding how to cope with a medical condition, patients
often discover aspects of themselves that their healthy life never revealed.
For example, women diagnosed with breast cancer who face the choice of
a mastectomy or lumpectomy must examine their feelings about attrac-
tiveness, sexuality, and the possibility of death. Patients who learn that
they are HIV-positive must wrestle with having an incurable disease,
while summoning the psychological strength that can help them remain
healthy.'8 0 Crucial to patients' ability to attain these insights is the qual-
ity of their conversations with their doctors.' Frank, open discussions
with doctors encourage patients' self-realization and self-fulfillment; sti-
fled discourse in which conversation about certain topics is off-limits or
prescripted impedes them.' 82
The right to engage freely in conversations with doctors about treat-
ment alternatives is a corollary to the constitutional right to refuse"unwanted medical treatment"' 8 3 and the right of bodily integrity under-
lying the doctrine of informed consent.18 4 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that First Amendment protection of the right to receive ideas is a"necessary predicate" to the "meaningful exercise of the rights of speech,
press, and political freedom."'8 5 Government regulations that confine
patients' knowledge to only state-approved treatments sabotage the con-
179 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
180 Indeed, there is evidence that high-quality doctor-patient communication may
contribute to long-term survival of HIV infection. See MICHAEL CALLEN, SURVIVING
AIDS 45 (1990) (reporting that preliminary studies on long-term survivors of AIDS
indicate that most had "extraordinary" relationships with their physicians, character-
ized as a "healing partnership").
181 William B. Stiles et al., Interaction Exchange Structure and Patient Satisfaction
with Medical Interviews, 17 MED. CARE 667 (1979) (reporting that patients are more
satisfied with physician visits when allowed to express themselves in their own words,
and when physicians are more informative).
182 Patients are generally more satisfied with physician visits, and experience
improved health, if allowed to discuss a wide range of psychological and social, in
addition to medical, issues that concern them. See Zeev Ben-Sira, Primary Medical
Care and Coping with Stress and Disease, 21 Soc. ScI. & MED. 485 (1985) (stating that
patients may judge the quality and efficacy of medical treatment on the physician's"affective" behavior).
183 Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
184 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
185 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
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stitutional right to make autonomous medical decisions and chart the
course of one's health care. Indeed, preserving and protecting patients'
ability to acquire complete medical information may be the most effective
means of promoting sound health care decisions, and the best defense
against the imposition of state medicine.18 6
Thus, contrary to the Third Circuit's ruling in Casey,'87 conversations
between doctors and patients about diagnosis and treatments are not
commercial speech. 88 Commercial speech is expression that does no
more than "propose a commercial transaction."'8 9 Consistent with the
attenuated relationship between commercial speech and free speech val-
ues, 19 government restrictions on commercial speech are not subject to
the rigorous scrutiny that they receive when they apply to fully protectedspeech.' 9 '
186 Scholars have long recognized the relationship between the First Amendment's
protection of access to information and self-governance. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH, supra note 159, at 26 ("Just so far as... the citizens who are to decide an
issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or
criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-
balanced planning for the general good."); Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry
(Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popu-
lar Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives.").
187 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
188 The Supreme Court has recognized that commercial speech that concerns a
lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent is covered by the First Amendment,
but is entitled to less protection against government regulation than fully protected
categories of speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Legal scholars have hotly debated whether com-
mercial speech deserves any First Amendment protection. Compare Martin Redish,
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434 (1971) (arguing that commercial speech
furthers First Amendment purposes) with C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 13 (1976) (arguing that com-
mercial speech does not further First Amendment values).
189 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
However, when speech that proposes a commercial transaction is "inextricably inter-
twined" with speech that is informative and persuasive, the entire expression is fully
protected speech. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
190 Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989)
(reasoning that the limited measure of protection for commercial speech is commen-
surate with its subordinate position in the hierarchy of First Amendment values).
191 To comply with the First Amendment, restrictions on fully protected speech
must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Restric-
tions on commercial speech do not violate the First Amendment as long as they are
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It should be clear from the foregoing discussion of the relationship
between medical speech and the discovery of truth, autonomy, and self-
realization that conversations between doctors and patients do more than
propose a commercial transaction. That doctor-patient discourse often
takes place within a profit-making context does not deprive it of full pro-
tection under the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has held,"speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is
spent to project it." 19'
Although the Supreme Court has never held that the rendering or
receipt of medical advice is fully protected speech, 193 several decisions
support this conclusion, most notably Board of Trustees of the State Uni-
versity of New York v. Fox.' In Fox, the Court considered whether a
state university's regulation banning commercial activities on school
property and in students' dormitory rooms violated the First Amend-
based merely on a substantial government interest, and are no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
192 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761; see also Riley, 487 U.S. at 801 ("It is well
settled that a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a
speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak."); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) ("The State was not free of all constitutional restraint merely
because . . .appellant's motive or the motive of the advertiser may have involved
financial gain .... "); TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-15, at 891 (arguing that profit motive
does not strip the speaker of all First Amendment protection).
193 In analyzing the constitutionality of the gag rule, the dissenting Justices in Rust
applied the strict scrutiny test applicable to fully protected speech, rather than the
lower standard applicable to commercial speech. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783. It appears,
therefore, that these Justices consider doctor-patient speech to be fully protected
under the First Amendment. No lower federal court has explicitly held that doctor-
patient discourse is fully protected speech, although several courts have suggested
that it is. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53,
72-73 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that HHS regulation prohibiting physician from discuss-
ing abortion with patients violated the First Amendment); Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1504 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Charles v. Carey, 627
F.2d 772, 789 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that the regulations at issue "force[ ] the physi-
cian to act as a mouthpiece for the state's theory of life"); Guam Soc. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 n.9 (D. Guam 1990) (stating that
statute prohibiting doctors from soliciting patients for abortion violated the First
Amendment), affd, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992);
Planned Parenthood v. City of Wichita, 729 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (D. Kan. 1990) (stat-
ing that women have a First Amendment right to receive information about abortion
from doctors); Meyer v. Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, 330 F. Supp. 1328, 1332
(D. Mass. 1971) (holding that doctor's allegation that hospital's practice of preventing
him from disclosing dangers of certain medical procedures stated a cause of action
under the First Amendment).
194 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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ment. Students filed suit after a housewares seller was forcibly ejected by
campus guards from a dormitory room. Determining that the regulation
was overbroad because it reached several categories of clearly noncom-
mercial speech, the Court stated:
On the record before us here, [the regulation] must be deemed to
reach some non-commercial speech .... [A deponent testified that
it] would prohibit tutoring, legal advice, and medical consultations
provided (for a fee) in students' dormitory rooms. While these
examples consist of speech for a profit, they do not consist of speech
that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines com-
mercial speech. Some of our most valuable forms of fully protected
speech are uttered for a profit.195
Several other Court opinions involving professional advertising and
solicitation 96 also support the proposition that speech occurring within
the confines of a doctor-patient relationship is fully protected by the First
Amendment. In these cases, the Court has suggested that professional
advertising and solicitation, which it has relegated to the category of com-
mercial speech, do not include communication occurring after the forma-
tion of a professional relationship.'97 Moreover, the Court's repeated
characterization of professional advertising 9 ' and in-person solicita-
195 Id. at 482 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
196 None of these decisions analyzing the First Amendment status of professional
advertising and solicitation concerning physicians involved other types of licensed
professionals, such as lawyers, pharmacists, and optometrists. For an analysis of the
application of the commercial speech doctrine to physician advertising, see William C.
Canby & Ernest Gellhorn, Physician Advertising: The First Amendment and the Sher-
man Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 543, 546-564.
197 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7
(1985) (noting that attorney advertisements that included statements regarding the
legal rights of persons injured by the Dalkon Shield "in another context, would be
fully protected speech"); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 n.17 (1977) (citing with
approval appellees' concession that appellant lawyer's meeting with prospective client
to give advice concerning legal rights was fully protected under the First
Amendment).
198 See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Reg. & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 99-106
(1990) (holding that state's censuring attorney's use of letterhead that advertised his
certification as a trial specialist implicated commercial speech); Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476-78 (1988) (holding that attorney letter soliciting clients
from pool of people with particular legal problems involved commercial speech);
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-38 (holding that attorney advertisements soliciting clients
were commercial speech); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (finding that Mis-
souri prohibition on attorney advertising affected commercial speech); Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381-84 (1977) (holding that bar association rule prohibiting adver-
tising by attorneys affected commercial speech); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (finding that statute banning advertising of contraceptive
devices affected commercial speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
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tion' 99 as commercial speech does not refute the conclusion that doctor-
patient discourse about medical treatment is fully protected, noncommer-
cial speech.200 The purpose of professional advertising and in-person
solicitation, which occur prior to the formation of a fiduciary relationship,
is to acquire employment for the professional. Prospective patient/client
listeners receive little from advertisements other than the offer of future
professional advice. Even when professional advertisements include gen-
eral advice, it is unsolicited and of little value to the listener. 20 1 As such,
these expressions are only minimally related to personal liberty or the
discovery of truth.20 2 Expressions after the formation of this relationship,
on the other hand, identify and resolve patient/clients' unique medical or
legal problems and thus implicate a number of First Amendment
values.2 03
zens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758-60 (1976) (holding that statute barring pharmacists
from advertising drug prices affected commercial speech).
199 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1797-98 (1993) (holding that state's
ban on in-person solicitation by accountants affected commercial speech); Ohralik v.
Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-57 (1978) (finding that in-person solicitation by
attorneys involved commercial speech).
200 Conversations between doctors and patients about medical treatment always
occur after the establishment of a formal doctor-patient relationship. Under the com-
mon law of tort and contract, the doctor-patient relationship, which gives rise to a full
range of fiduciary duties, is created by either an express or implied agreement. A
doctor-patient relationship is impliedly formed once a physician examines a patient,
renders a diagnosis, or discusses treatment. Therefore, all conversations between doc-
tors and patients about diagnosis and treatment occur within the confines of a doctor-
patient relationship. See Heller v. Peekskill Community Hosp., 603 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549
(N.Y.A.D. 1993) (holding that doctor-patient relationship was created when profes-
sional services were rendered and accepted); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1969) (finding no implied doctor-patient relationship because doctor did not
examine or treat patient); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937) (finding that
doctor-patient relationship was formed when physician undertook treatment and rec-
ommended hospitalization).
201 Arguably, advertising and in-person solicitation present a greater danger of
overreaching by professionals, making more compelling the need for government reg-
ulation to ensure the accuracy of professional expression made before professional
relationships are formed. Indeed, the Court has often expressed concern about this
danger of overreaching and undue influence that exists during communication
between professionals and prospective patients/clients. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 773 n.25 ("Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with
the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising."); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58 (suggesting that
in-person solicitation by attorneys may disserve society's interests).
202 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459 ("A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employ-
ment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns.").
203 See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
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It is important to understand that categorizing doctor-patient speech as
fully protected under the First Amendment does not preclude any and all
government regulation. It merely recognizes that doctor-patient dis-
course, like other forms of fully protected speech, has special status
within First Amendment jurisprudence 20 4 because of its essential role in
protecting and preserving personal liberty and the discovery of truth.215
It is clear that patients are extremely vulnerable to physician coercion
and misrepresentation, and that government regulation is needed to safe-
guard patients' receipt of truthful, nondeceptive information. Yet, as pre-
viously stated, the qualities of doctor-patient speech that make patients
vulnerable to physician coercion 206 also make them vulnerable to govern-
ment coercion. After properly categorizing doctor-patient discourse as
fully protected speech, the challenge is to fashion a theory that will per-
mit government regulations that promote patients' receipt of truthful
information necessary to make informed, autonomous, and rational deci-
sions, but that will simultaneously prohibit regulations that silence or
compel speech for the purpose of enforcing a medical orthodoxy. The
next two parts of this Article will undertake this challenge.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
THAT SILENCE PHYSICIAN SPEECH
Regulations that silence publicly or privately funded physicians' speech
infringe upon patients' audience-based First Amendment interests in sev-
eral ways. First, regulations prohibiting physicians from discussing partic-
ular treatments distort patients' health care decision making by fostering
an incomplete understanding of medical alternatives.20 7 Second, the
204 Doctor-patient communication already enjoys a unique status in the law of evi-
dence. The doctor-patient testimonial privilege reflects the judgment that the discov-
ery of possibly probative evidence is less important than protecting the integrity of
doctor-patient communication and preserving patients' privacy. See WILLIAM
STRONG ET AL., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98, at 368 (4th ed. 1992).
205 A comprehensive analysis of lawyer-client speech under the First Amendment
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, many of the arguments made here
apply with equal force to communication between lawyers and clients after the forma-
tion of a professional relationship. From the standpoint of the marketplace of ideas
model, lawyer-client communication facilitates a lawyer's discovery of the "truth"
about how best to handle a particular legal problem. On a "macro" level, unhindered
lawyer-client communication also advances the efficient and equitable operation of
the legal system. From the standpoint of the personal liberty model, lawyer-client
speech may be closely related to preserving client autonomy. On the other hand,
some types of lawyer-client communication-namely those concerned with commer-
cial matters-would appear to fall within the category of "commercial speech,"
because they merely concern commercial transactions, and thus have a more attenu-
ated relationship to the discovery of truth and personal liberty.
206 See supra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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state-dictated omission of a potential medical treatment from doctor-
patient discourse necessarily destroys the possibility of authentic patient
consent. 208 Finally, regulations that prevent physicians from informing
patients about particular treatments subvert patient autonomy by, in
effect, making government a silent partner in medical decision making.20 9
Under established constitutional jurisprudence, government regula-
tions that prevent publicly or privately funded physicians from discussing
particular treatments violate patients' First Amendment rights. 21 0 It is
well-settled that government restrictions censoring what people may say
or hear strike at the very heart of a free society.21' Justice Brandeis's
famous concurrence in Whitney v. California212 contains one of the earli-
est and most eloquent warnings against the assault on audience-based
rights, which occurs when government excises ideas from discourse:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in
its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbi-
trary.... Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of
force in its worst form.213
The danger of government censorship extends beyond the silenced
speaker. Listeners also have a right to receive information that is
independent of speakers' First Amendment right to express ideas.214
208 See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
209 For example, if a patient with coronary artery disease was prevented by the
state from hearing about nonsurgical options, such as angioplasty, and thereafter
chose to undergo triple-bypass surgery, that ultimate decision would be as much an
exercise of governmental preference as of the patient's free will.
210 They may also violate physicians' speech rights. See supra note 90 and accom-
panying text. However, the purpose of this analysis is to establish a jurisprudential
foundation for patients' First Amendment right to receive complete, unbiased medical
advice from their physicians.
211 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that the "bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment ... is that government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
212 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 375-76.
214 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[Tlhe First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
may draw"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But
where a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stat-
ing that it is "now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invali-
dating statute that required Postmaster to detain and deliver only upon addressee's
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Indeed, the extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech
rests upon the recognition of the right of listeners to receive informa-
tion.215 Protecting this audience-based right to receive information
requires more than simply prohibiting governmental interference with
willing speakers. It implies a constitutional right to accumulate knowl-
edge and thereby retain control over one's own thought processes.216
In order to protect the rights of both speakers and listeners, govern-
ment regulations censoring expression by particular speakers on the basis
of content are subject to the strictest scrutiny,217 and consequently such
measures are rarely upheld.21 8 While some Supreme Court opinions
request mail containing communist literature, because it interfered with addressee's
First Amendment rights); id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-147 (1943) (asserting that freedom to distribute informa-
tion to those who desire it is vital to the preservation of a free society).
215 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
("[Tihe extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides .... );
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980) ("Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker,
but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dis-
semination of information."); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("The lis-
tener's interest is substantial . . . . [Sluch speech serves individual and societal
interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.").
216 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 ("Whatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally prem-
ise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("[Tlhe State may not, consistently with
the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (reversing teacher's conviction for teach-
ing German in violation of state law because, among other reasons, it interfered with
"the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge"); see also Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Our review of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions confirms that the First Amendment does not merely-prohibit the government
from enacting laws that censor information, but additionally encompasses the positive
right of public access to information and ideas."); National Treasury Employees
Union v. King, 798 F. Supp. 780, 785 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[T]he First Amendment pro-
tects the rights of citizens to receive information and to acquire useful knowledge.");
Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
2 (arguing that we ought to consider "the right to know" as an integral part of the
system of free expression embodied in the First Amendment).
217 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 196-97 (1983) (noting that no matter what formulation it uses, the
Court applies a "different and more stringent standard" to content-based restrictions
than to content-neutral restrictions on speech).
218 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 (invalidating statute that prohibited corpo-
rations from making contributions to influence certain votes, on grounds that govern-
ment cannot "dictat[e] the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers
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refer to a complete lack of governmental authority to censor the content
of speech, 219 recent decisions have used less absolute terms, and have
held that restrictions that censor speech on the basis of its content are
presumptively invalid 221 unless they apply to categories of expression that
are constitutionally proscribable.22'
Content-based regulations need not explicitly target a particular view-
point to run afoul of the First Amendment. Restrictions that silence
speech about certain subjects also fall within the First Amendment's pro-
hibition against content-based regulations 222 because they distort full
debate and informed decision making223 and impede the discovery of
truth.224 Moreover, subject-matter restrictions give rise to a presumption
of viewpoint discrimination.225
who may address a public issue"); see also Stone, supra note 217, at 196 (noting that
"the Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has consid-
ered in the past quarter century"). But see Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1849
(1992) (upholding Tennessee statute prohibiting solicitation of votes and distribution
of campaign literature within 100 feet of polling place on election day).
219 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971) ("[Albove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
220 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-43 (1992) (holding that
content-based regulations are presumptively invalid unless the speech falls within lim-
ited exceptions); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 504 (1991) (holding statute imposing financial burden on
speakers based on speech content presumptively incompatible with the First Amend-
ment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)
(stating that permissible restriction on speech may not be based on content or subject
matter).
221 Proscribable speech includes statements that are obscene, false, or defamatory.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
222 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1850 ("This Court has held that the First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular
viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." (citing
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537)).
223 See Stone, supra note 217, at 217 (asserting that content-based regulations
restrict communication of only some messages and thus affect public debate
generally).
224 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the "best test of truth" is the power of an idea to survive the competi-
tion in the marketplace).
225 See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (stating that "when regulation is
based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more care-
fully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public
officials disapprove the speaker's views.' " (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); see also Stone, supra note 217, at 231
(stating that restrictions directed at a particular item of information raise a substantial
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Prior restraints that prohibit publicly or privately funded physicians
from speaking to patients about medical treatments raise the free speech
concerns that generally plague content and subject-matter restrictions.
Measures that prohibit physicians from discussing therapies distort
patients' assessment of the relative risks and benefits of available thera-
pies, and thus distort the decision-making process as a whole. A patient
who is not told about a certain treatment is not likely to choose it, and
may end up selecting from among treatments that are not the best for him
or her. In this way, restrictions barring publicly or privately funded phy-
sicians from discussing certain treatments destroy the possibility of genu-
ine consent, autonomy, and the discovery of truth by preventing patients
from learning about options that they otherwise might have chosen.
The distortion caused by these restrictions is substantial because
patients have no comparable alternative means of acquiring medical
information.226 This is particularly true for restrictions that apply to all
physicians because patients often lack the background necessary to edu-
cate themselves about unspoken treatments. Restrictions that bar a finite
class of physicians227 from discussing a medical option also cause substan-
tial distortion because patients are likely to find it impractical, if not
risk that the restriction was adopted because regulators disagreed with the
information).
226 Any restriction that distorts the content of communication implicates First
Amendment concerns, but this distortion is substantial if speakers have no alternative
means of expression and listeners have no alternative means to acquire the forbidden
information. See Stone, supra note 217, at 217; see also Benston, supra note 122, at
315-16 ("Fear of an imposed orthodoxy is justified where there is a significant limita-
tion on the expression of alternative or supplementary speech."). However, an alter-
native means analysis makes little sense in the context of restrictions that bar a
physician from mentioning a treatment to a patient. In order for patients to acquire
information elsewhere, they must know that they did not receive complete informa-
tion, as well as the identity of the missing item of information. In some cases, com-
mon knowledge may alert patients to the absence of a specific treatment, such as the
option of abortion as a treatment for an unwanted pregnancy. More typically, how-
ever, the range of treatment alternatives is not common knowledge, and patients are
not likely to detect that an option was missing from the doctor's presentation and to
recognize the need for an alternative information source.
227 An example of such a restrictions is the "gag rule" at issue in Rust, which
barred only those physicians who work in publicly financed clinics from discussing
abortion with patients. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. In justifying its
decision to uphold the gag rule, the Supreme Court noted that patients were still free
to acquire information about abortion from privately financed physicians. Rust, 111
S. Ct. at 1777. This rationale has been roundly criticized by commentators who argue
that if publicly financed clinic patients had the financial resources to obtain private
health care, they would not be clinic patients in the first place. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
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impossible, to consult several physicians in order to acquire complete
information about alternative treatments.228
Any restriction on physicians' speech about treatments also raises the
spectre of viewpoint discrimination.229 Whenever government silences
discussion about a particular treatment, it suggests a preference for other
treatments. The "gag rule" at issue in Rust 2 0 and statutes prohibiting
physician speech about contraception and abortion 21 are plainly based
on government's disapproval of those options and its preference for other
alternatives.
Finally, regulations that censor physicians' speech about treatment
alternatives destroy an essential precondition of the meaningful exercise
of patients' constitutional right to control the course of their medical
treatment.23 2 Patients cannot meaningfully exercise the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment or to control what happens to their bodies
unless they can make decisions informed by open, frank discussions with
their physicians about medical options.
Thus, a prior restraint prohibiting physicians from discussing certain
treatments absolutely violates patients' constitutional right to receive
such information. 233 Moreover, because the degree to which a restriction
interferes with patients' audience-based rights is constant, whether it cen-
sors publicly financed physicians or all physicians is immaterial. Restric-
228 It is financially prohibitive for most patients to consult a number of physicians
in order to obtain complete information, and it is unlikely that insurance companies
would reimburse patients who have multiple consultations for this purpose. Even if
such coverage were available, it would likely contribute to an unnecessary increase in
the overall cost of health care.
229 See supra note 20; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding that a statute prohibiting phar-
macists from advertising drug prices violated the First Amendment because it "singles
out speech of a particular content and seeks to prevent its dissemination
completely").
230 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 11-12.
232 Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that patients have a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest in determining the course of their medical
treatment).
233 Perhaps the only constitutionally defensible restriction would be one barring
physicians from discussing treatments that had been empirically proven harmful to
patients. Under a marketplace of ideas analysis, such a restriction does not touch
upon First Amendment concerns, because it pertains to information that is empiri-
cally false. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 ("Untruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake."). Additionally, doctor-patient
discussions about harmful treatments contribute nothing to protecting patients' per-
sonal liberty interests. Finally, government has a compelling interest in protecting the
public health by shielding patients from harmful treatments, particularly because
patients cannot evaluate the effectiveness of treatments for themselves.
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tions that silence publicly funded physicians from discussing certain
treatments violate the First Amendment no less than restrictions that
silence private physicians.23 4
Consider, for example, a restriction barring physicians from discussing
unproven or experimental treatments 235 with patients. Unlike a restric-
tion barring discussion of treatments that have proved ineffective, a ban
on discussions of experimental treatments would be based to a large
degree on inference, opinion, and interpretation. Whenever government
determines the truth or falsity of matters that are within the realm of
opinion rather than fact, free speech concerns are implicated.23 6
Moreover, the suppression of physician speech about unproven thera-
pies may actually interfere with the discovery of truth. Many therapies
are effective for some people and not others, or they may prove effective
over time through clinical use.237 This is particularly true in the case of
new diseases like AIDS. In a sense, all treatments for HIV-infection and
associated opportunistic infections are experimental, 3 8 and doctors' abil-
ity to apprise patients of experimental treatments contributes to our
234 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
235 The term "experimental treatment" as used here describes therapies that have
been developed in the laboratory, but have not been approved by the Federal Drug
Administration for distribution to patients. On the average, this approval process
takes 12 years. Dale E. Weirenga, The Drug Development and Approval Process, in
AIDS REFERENCE GUIDE 1 1306, at 9 (1993) (on file with the Boston University Law
Review).
236 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 187 (1981)
("[Wihere empirical questions are almost inseparable from inference and interpreta-
tion, there is the danger that authoritative attempts to say what is or is not 'true'
would lead to the establishment of orthodoxies and heresies that have no place in a
democratic society."); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978)
("[T]the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1963) ("Authoritative interpretations of the First Amend-
ment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of
truth-whether administered by judges, juries or administrative officials .... ").
237 For an interesting discussion of the evolving nature of scientific truth and its
impact upon government restriction of scientific expression, see Martin Redish, Prod-
uct Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight
Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1443 (1990) (arguing that, from
a broad historical perspective, any governmental attempt to "lock in a prevailing sci-
entific consensus" is likely to be either futile or dangerous, and will undermine the
search for knowledge and the development of free and open exchange of information
and opinion).
238 This point is illustrated by the recent shift in the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Disease (NIAID) policy toward treatments for HIV-infection. The
NIAID recently retreated from its earlier recommendation in favor of the use of
antiretroviral medicines, such as Zidovudine (AZT). Now, NIAID emphasizes that
doctors and patients should decide together whether and when use of such treatments
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knowledge about AIDS in general and the effectiveness of treatments for
it in individual cases.
Doctor-patient discourse about experimental treatments also facilitates
patients' personal liberty interests. The right to determine the course of
one's medical treatment does not turn on governmental preference for
that decision. Patients with an incurable disease have the right to opt for
an unproven treatment that offers hope, however dim, of relief or cure. 23 9
Restrictions that bar physicians from discussing experimental treat-
ments240 thus prevent patients from managing their illness and con-
ducting their lives according to their personal values.24 '
V. A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
THAT COMPEL PHYSICIAN SPEECH
Regulations that compel physician speech present several discrete dan-
gers to patients' audience-based interests. First, patients' privacy and
control over their own thinking are compromised when they are forced to
hear objectionable messages under circumstances in which escape is not
feasible.242 Second, such regulations may unduly influence patients who
is appropriate. See Merle A. Sande et al., Antiretroviral Therapy for Adult HIV-
Infected Patients, 270 JAMA 2583, 2584 (1993).
239 In fact, physicians may be liable for failing to disclose the existence of experi-
mental treatments to patients, under the doctrine of informed consent. See APPEL-
BAUM ET AL., supra note 28, at 41-49.
240 Of course, preserving patients' personal liberty also requires that doctors
inform patients when a treatment is experimental. See, e.g., Estrada v. Jaques, 321
S.E.2d 240, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). Many jurisdictions have passed statutes and
regulations requiring informed consent for human experimentation. See, e.g., N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1993) (requiring written informed consent of
all human subjects of research); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1992) (requiring informed
consent of human subjects of federally funded scientific experimentation). For a dis-
cussion of the First Amendment implications of informed consent statutes that com-
pel rather than silence physician speech, see infra part V.
241 The government's interest in protecting patients from experimental treatments
that may help them is considerably less compelling than its interest in protecting
patients from treatments that will certainly harm them. There are less restrictive ways
for government to prevent the use of questionable treatments, ways that do not impli-
cate free speech rights. For example, the government can enjoin drug manufacturers
to remove experimental drugs from the marketplace or prosecute doctors who pre-
scribe them. The government can also issue public service messages warning people
of the suspected dangers of unproven drugs. These measures would prevent the harm
that might result from the imprudent use of unproven therapies, without undermining
patients' free speech interests.
242 For example, patients who oppose the use of artificial contraception would
likely feel trapped and offended if forced to listen to their physician deliver a speech
expressing the government's view that women ought to practice artificial birth
control.
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hold physicians in high regard or whose ability to think critically is
impaired by illness and lack of medical expertise.243 Third, compelled
physician speech may result in a biased description of available treat-
ments, thus distorting patients' understanding of their medical choices
and undermining patient autonomy and consent.
The First Amendment, in addition to prohibiting government censor-
ship, also protects "negative speech rights," or the right not to be forced
to speak.2 " Negative speech rights safeguard speakers' freedom of
thought and belief, promote the expression of dissent, and prevent the
imposition of government orthodoxy, all of which are threatened when-
ever government forces individuals to utter certain words.245
Negative speech rights supply the foundation for analyzing the effect of
regulations compelling physicians' speech on their constitutional rights.2 46
However, negative speech rights cannot constitute the foundation of a
patient-based theory, which must rest instead on decisions that establish
that the First Amendment affords listeners a right to receive unbiased
information or to avoid unwanted expression altogether.
Several Court decisions imply a right of listeners to be protected from
intrusive speech and to receive unbiased information. The Court has
recognized, for example, that the First Amendment protects captive audi-
ences from being forced to listen to unwanted government propa-
243 See discussion supra part II.
244 Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1987) (stating that in
the context of protected speech, the difference between compelled speech and com-
pelled silence "is without constitutional significance"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1976) ("[Tlhe right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.").
245 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The
Court has correctly observed that government resorts to compelling speech when it
fails to achieve consensus by means of legitimate persuasion, and this necessity in
itself suggests that its position is defective. See id. at 640 ("As first and moderate
methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to
an ever-increasing severity."). The enactment of measures that compel physicians to
discourage patients from choosing to have an abortion demonstrates the Court's the-
sis. Having failed to achieve a national consensus to outlaw abortion by means of
persuasion, anti-abortion regulators have resorted to direct manipulation of the con-
tent of medical discourse.
246 While a comprehensive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
government measures that compel physicians to make statements about a preferred
treatment or a disfavored option may violate the First Amendment by infringing on
physicians' negative speech rights. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 ("[Wlhere the State's
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest
cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming a courier
for such message."). However, patients' audience-based rights under the First
Amendment arguably suffer an even greater blow from such regulations. See discus-
sion supra part IV.
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ganda.247 Forcing captive audiences to listen to unwanted messages not
only violates First Amendment interests by intruding upon their private
mental processes,248 it also skews the marketplace of ideas and subverts
individuals' personal liberty.249 The Supreme Court has also implied that
this audience-based right to avoid unwanted messages is particularly
strong when the message contains government propaganda.250
247 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975) ("This Court has
considered analogous issues-pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against
the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors .... "); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("While
petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no
right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.");
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("[N]o one has a
right to press even good ideas on an unwilling recipient."); Public Utils. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 463-66 (1952) (rejecting plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, but
acknowledging that forcing unwanted messages upon captive audiences raises consti-
tutional concerns); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) ("The unwilling lis-
tener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot
be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape
this interference . . . except through the protection of the municipality." (footnote
omitted)); cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("[W]e have repeatedly held
that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes
and that the government may protect this freedom.").
248 For varying perspectives on the constitutional origins, scope, and purpose of the
captive audience doctrine, see Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose but Hear: The
Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 967 (1953) ("Forced listening
destroys and denies, practically and symbolically, that unfettered interplay and com-
petition among ideas which is the assumed ambient of the communication free-
doms."); Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken
to? 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153, 194-95 (1972) (arguing that listeners ought to be protected
from intrusive messages if they are physically captive, unable to "turn off" the
message, involuntarily within earshot of the message, and have exhausted all means of
avoidance); Note, I'll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It ... But Not to Me-
The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211, 212
("The captive audience doctrine arises from the same First Amendment values which
serve to protect freedom of speech. The doctrine is therefore not an exception to the
mandates of the First Amendment, but a necessary corollary of free speech.").
249 In such instances, the government's power and weight are thrown behind one
viewpoint, while drowning out the expression of all others.
250 Pollak, 343 U.S. at 463. In Pollak, citizens claimed that their First Amendment
right "to listen only to such points of view as the listener wishes to hear," was violated
by the radio broadcasting on public buses of programs selected by the municipality
that owned and operated the transit system. Id. The Pollak Court implied that the
municipality's broadcasts might have violated the First Amendment if they had con-
tained "objectionable propaganda," rather than music, commercial advertising, or
announcements. Id. ("There is no substantial claim that the programs have been used
for objectionable propaganda. There is no issue of that kind before us."). In separate
opinions, Justices Black and Douglas echoed the view that First Amendment concerns
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The power of the First Amendment to shield listeners from intrusive
messages was also the basis of the Court's decision in Burson v. Free-
man.251 In Burson, the Court upheld a Tennessee statute2 52 that prohib-
ited solicitation of votes and the display of campaign materials within 100
feet of the entrance to a polling place on election day. A plurality of the
Court 253 reasoned that Tennessee's interest in protecting voters from
"intimidation" 254 during the "last 15 seconds before [they] enter the pol-
ling place, 255 outweighed candidates' First Amendment right of political
expression. 25 6 Burson may be read to establish the principle that on the
eve of exercising a constitutionally protected right, listeners are entitled
to a zone free from speech that is intimidating, confusing, or unduly influ-
ential.257 Indeed, in Burson the Court struck a balance that protected
voters' audience-based rights, even though this meant upholding a gov-
are especially urgent when the government subjects captive listeners to its views.
According to Justice Black, "the broadcasting of news, public speeches, views, or
propaganda of any kind and by any means would violate the First Amendment." Id.
at 466 (Black, J., concurring). Taking a characteristically absolutist position, Justice
Douglas asserted that the First Amendment is violated when the government foists
any type of message upon a captive audience, because this practice interferes with the
"sanctity of thought" and gives "the propagandist a powerful weapon." Id. at 468-69
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's view that government is absolutely pro-
hibited from forcing its message upon captive audiences is overstated. There are
many examples of captive audiences that benefit greatly from receiving government
messages and who would be substantially harmed by such a blanket prohibition. One
example is prisoners in need of AIDS education.
Pollak is the only captive audience case that balanced the government's right to
disseminate information against captive listeners' right to avoid unwanted messages.
In all other captive audience cases, the First Amendment challenge was brought by
private speakers prevented from projecting their message by government restrictions;
the government then defended the restrictions on the ground that they shielded cap-
tive audiences from unwanted intrusions. See supra note 248.
251 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (plurality opinion).
252 TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (Supp. 1991).
253 The plurality opinion was announced by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment upholding the statute's constitutionality, but on the grounds that it was a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nontraditional public forum, and thus
need not be subjected to exacting scrutiny. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1859-61 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
254 Id. at 1851.
255 Id. at 1857.
256 Id. at 1858.
257 Id. at 1856 ("The only way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit access
to the area around the voter.").
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ernment restriction on political speech, which has traditionally enjoyed
the most protection under the First Amendment. 258
Public education decisions are also useful in developing a patient-based
theory of doctor-patient speech. As several commentators have
observed, public education presents unique dangers to audience-based
interests by creating ideal conditions for indoctrination.259 The injection
of ideological bias into a curriculum conflicts with the underlying purpose
of education, which is to expose students to a "robust exchange of ideas"
so that the truth can be discovered " 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.' ,260 To guard
against this danger, it is well established that the government may not
manipulate the content of the curriculum for the purpose of advancing a
particular ideological 261 or religious viewpoint. 26 2 Moreover, as a check
258 Eu v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign
for political office." (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)));
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal agree-
ment that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("For
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.").
259 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-4, at 812 ("Public schools... can be power-
ful means of indoctrination."); MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLI-
TICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 211 (1983):
In some ways, public schools are a communications theorist's dream: the audi-
ence is captive and immature; the channel can't be changed (although students
may only pretend to listen); the messages are labelled as educational (and not as
advertising); the teacher can respond individually to the student (unlike the tele-
vision set); adult communicators often have relatively high status in the eyes of
the audience; and a system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce
the message.
260 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943))
(alteration in original), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
261 See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982) (stating that states "rightly
possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. But
that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner.");
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which
the State chooses to communicate."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(invalidating state law prohibiting teaching of evolution theory in state-supported
schools); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("[T]he First Amendment... does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ...... ); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating statute forbidding teaching of foreign lan-
guages in public and private schools).
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on government's ability to use public education as an instrument of prop-
aganda, the Court has attributed constitutional significance to the con-
cept of "academic freedom," vesting teachers with the right to shape the
specific content of academic discourse within the contours of a curricu-
lum established by the state.263
Finally, the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of the "fairness
doctrine, 264 which requires broadcasters to present a balanced discussion
of public issues, is useful in determining whether, and under what circum-
stances, listeners have a right to receive unbiased and balanced infor-
mation. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission,265 the Court assessed the constitutionality of government
regulation of broadcasting, and recognized that the First Amendment
affords listeners an affirmative right to receive a balanced presentation of
views when there are a limited number of sources from which to acquire
information.266 Although the Court recognized that the Constitution
262 The Court has often held that a state's effort to inject religious bias into the
public school curriculum violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana statute that
required teaching creation science when teaching evolution); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating Kentucky statute requiring posting of the Ten Command-
ments on public school walls); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97 (invalidating statute banning
teaching of evolution); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invali-
dating state requirement that Biblical passages be read at the beginning of the school
day); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating state requirement that official
prayer be recited at the beginning of the school day); see also Peloza v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (upholding school dis-
trict's reprimand of biology teacher for espousing creationism and reasoning that stu-
dents "have a right to be taught biology without the added comments and religious
biases" of the teacher).
263 For scholarly analysis of the constitutional status and implications of "academic
freedom," see J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitu-
tional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293 (1976); David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of 'Individual' and 'Insti-
tutional' Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1990, at 227.
264 The "fairness doctrine" consists of statutory and regulatory provisions that
require radio and television broadcasters to present a balance of views on public
issues. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1992).
265 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
266 Id. at 390 ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas... rather than to countenance monopolization of that mar-
ket ... ."); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (stating
that the fairness doctrine is necessary to "secure the public's First Amendment inter-
est in receiving a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public con-
cern"); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973) (" '[Wihat is
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protects broadcasters' freedom to "broadcast whatever they choose," '267
in light of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Court held that the audi-
ence's "collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment" was "paramount., 268
Accordingly, the Court upheld the fairness doctrine as a constitutionally
necessary means of preserving listeners' audience-based right to receive"social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences ' 269
within a communications marketplace monopolized by only a few
270voices.
Under this reasoning, government regulations that compel physicians
to utter viewpoint-based messages violate patients' First Amendment
right to receive unbiased medical advice from physicians. Patients in a
physician's office, medical clinic, or hospital are a "captive audience,"
since their presence there is compelled by illness.271 Once in the presence
of a physician, substantial physical and psychological barriers make gov-
ernment-mandated messages extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
ignore.22 While patients can simply discard printed materials, 273 they
have "no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to
listen" when the state's message is communicated orally.274
Doctor-patient communication possesses many of the same characteris-
tics that in public education lead to a substantial risk of government
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
said .... .'" (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1948)).
267 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
268 Id. at 390.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 400-01.
271 Although doctors' advice is occasionally sought for conditions that do not
threaten health, in most cases patients consult physicians because they are ill and
need treatment.
272 The patient's medical condition and the timing of the message may make avoid-
ance physically impossible. This would be true, for example, if the patient was
nonambulatory or if the message was delivered after the patient had disrobed.
273 In some circumstances, patients could arguably avoid an unwanted written gov-
ernment message. For example, patients could readily avoid government flyers that
were stacked in a waiting room simply by choosing not to pick one up. On the other
hand, patients could not reasonably avoid government posters affixed to the wall of a
waiting room where they were required to sit before seeing a physician, or written
forms that they were required to read before undergoing treatment. Under these
circumstances, patients are less able to avoid unwanted written messages than are
passengers surrounded by advertisements while riding buses and subways. Cf. Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding municipality's
refusal to display political advertisements on city buses because it minimized the
chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing a message
upon a captive audience).
274 Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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indoctrination.2 7 5 Because they hold physicians in such high regard27
and because they lose their sense of control during illness, patients are
highly impressionable and tend to become infantilized, impairing their
own ability to evaluate government-sponsored messages critically. 7
Further, the perception that physicians can mete out rewards or punish-
ment may also hamper patients' capacity to evaluate such a message.2
Finally, patients' critical capacities may be further impeded when a gov-
ernment message is disguised as medical advice rather than presented as
an expression of state opinion.279
Red Lion and its progeny also reveal that the First Amendment's goal
of promoting the discovery of truth and protecting listeners' personal lib-
erty may, in some circumstances, require more than merely allowing a
multiplicity of speakers to enter the information marketplace. When the
structure and nature of the marketplace limit the number of possible
speakers and sources of information, an audience's right to receive infor-
mation becomes the primary constitutional concern. In such a circum-
stance, the First Amendment's goals can only be advanced by requiring
that the few existing speakers present a balance of views. Thus, Red Lion
and its progeny establish that to protect audience-based interests, the
First Amendment requires content neutrality in an information market-
place monopolized by only a few speakers.
The information marketplace that informs patients' decision making is
monopolized by physicians.211 When faced with illness and the necessity
275 The chief distinction between public education and doctor-patient discourse is
that students are subjected to teachers' oral communication day after day, while phy-
sicians communicate with patients far less frequently, thus diminishing the potential
for government indoctrination. On the other hand, students' opinions will likely be
shaped by a number of other voices, such as parents, peers, and the media. Patients,
on the other hand, tend to rely exclusively on physicians to form opinions about medi-
cal treatment. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
278 If patients assume that physicians agree with the government's message, they
may fear that rejection of it will impair their relationship with the physician and may
even result in lower-quality health care. When physicians distance themselves from
the government's message, the same concerns may cause patients to fear acceptance
of government's opinion.
279 For example, the statement "the State of California believes that everyone
should donate their organs after death" is clearly an expression of governmental opin-
ion, and patients' ability to identify the source of the information facilitates their eval-
uation of it. In contrast, when government promotes its position by compelling
physicians to make statements that are infused with medical facts and terminology,
patients may be unable to identify the government as the speaker, and instead may
attribute the underlying viewpoint to their trusted physician.
280 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) ("The average patient
has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician
1994]
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of deciding among an array of treatment alternatives, patients rely exclu-
sively upon physicians-and usually only one-to acquire necessary
information. There are no reasonable alternative means for patients to
acquire medical information other than through physicians.28' Thus,
given the scarcity of voices that inform patients' medical decision making,
First Amendment goals can only be advanced by ensuring that physicians'
description of treatment alternatives is balanced and unbiased.
Finally, in accordance with the reasoning underlying Burson, patients'
right to be shielded from expressions of government views about treat-
ment options on the eve of medical decision making may deserve greater
constitutional protection than the government's power to compel physi-
cians to deliver its views. Physician speech that conveys the government's
preference to patients presents audience-based concerns similar to those
involved in political campaigning near polling places. 28 2 An analogous
audience-based danger would arise if government expressed its view to
voters on a particular referendum item as they entered polling places.
Moreover, unlike private speakers' right to engage in political speech,
which has an exalted status within First Amendment jurisprudence, the
First Amendment may not protect the government's right to speak.283
Of course, a blanket prohibition on all regulation of doctor-patient dis-
course would prevent the government from forcing doctors to bias their
presentation of treatment alternatives. Such a prohibition, however,
would come at great cost. Unlike restrictions that censor physician
speech or violate patients' audience-based interests, regulations that com-
pel physician speech can both advance and infringe First Amendment
interests. Government regulations compelling physician speech infringe
upon patients' audience-based interests if they capitalize on physicians'
authority within the structure of the doctor-patient relationship, and
unduly influence or confuse patients on the eve of exercising their consti-
tutional right to determine medical treatment. However, regulations
compelling physician speech promote First Amendment values and
patients' audience-based interests if they facilitate rational medical deci-
to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision."),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
281 See supra note 227.
282 Patients' ability to rationally and critically evaluate government speech is
adversely affected by the short interval between delivery of the message and the need
to make a decision. State-sponsored medical messages may therefore be unduly influ-
ential and confusing in part because they are heard moments before the patient must
make a medical decision.
283 The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment protects govern-
ment speech. For scholarly consideration of the question, see Mark G. Yudof, When
Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First
Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 867 (1979) (arguing that "the considerations favor-
ing constitutionalization of a government right to speak are neither persuasive nor
attractive").
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sion making through required disclosure of information that would other-
wise be withheld. It is likely, therefore, that the government advances
listeners' constitutional right to receive information when it compels
speech by speakers who have a commercial incentive to conceal informa-
tion, or who, like physicians, have a notorious history of inadequate
disclosure.28 4
As previously discussed, however, Casey ignores the paradoxical qual-
ity of compelled physician speech and its threat to patients' audience-
based interest in receiving information. 2 5 As a result, Casey does not
distinguish adequately between regulations that facilitate patient consent
by increasing the availability of medical information, and those that
undermine it by turning physicians into instruments of state propa-
ganda.2 8 The Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of other gov-
ernment regulations that mandate speech28 7 is similarly inadequate
because the Court assumes that the interests of government and the lis-
tening public are identical, and ignores the possibility that such measures
can be used for state indoctrination. As a result, the Court generally
resolves these cases merely by balancing the affected speakers' negative
speech rights against the government's interest in protecting the public.288
284 For analyses of this history, see APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 28; FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A
HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING
(1991).
285 See discussion supra part II.
286 Several scholars have examined the Court's inattention to the danger of state-
sponsored indoctrination that generally plagues its jurisprudence involving govern-
ment speech. As one writer explains,
[t]he paradoxical nature of government speech makes it difficult to decide which
way constitutional protection should cut. Expression by government is critical to
democratic processes, but the power of governments to communicate is also the
power to destroy the underpinnings of government by consent. The power to
teach, inform, and lead is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and
perpetuate the current regime. Persuasion, like coercion, can be employed for
many different purposes, some more acceptable than others.
YUDOF, supra note 259, at 42; see Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565 (1980); Ziegler, Jr., supra note 110.
287 There are a vast number of federal statutes that regulate the content of speech
by mandating disclosures by private speakers. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77a-78111 (1988)
(disclosure requirements in securities regulations); 15 U.S.C. § 1667a (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992) (disclosure requirements in consumer leases); 39 U.S.C. § 3685 (1988) (dis-
closure requirements for publications with periodical mailing privileges).
288 See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 788-95 (1988) (bal-
ancing fundraisers' rights of expression against the state's interest in preventing
fraud); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1986)
(balancing public utility's negative speech rights against the state's interest in effective
ratemaking proceedings and promoting speech).
1994]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:201
An adequate constitutional theory of government regulations that
compels physician speech must provide courts with a means of distin-
guishing measures that bring medical decision making into conformity
with the state's viewpoint from those that facilitate the full disclosure of
relevant, factual medical information.289 To achieve this, the following
test is proposed.29 ° To comport with the First Amendment, a statute or
regulation that compels physician speech must: (1) have a medical pur-
289 A number of commentators have generally examined the problem of govern-
ment speech and proposed various approaches to determining when the state's speech
facilitates or undermines audience-based interests. See, e.g., YUDOF, supra note 259,
at 301-06 (arguing for a variation of a "legislative remand" system to evaluate govern-
ment speech); Shiffrin, supra note 286, at 611 (arguing for an eclectic balancing
approach to evaluate government speech); Yudof, supra note 283, at 917 (arguing for
an "ultra vires" technique that would prohibit government speech activities that are"particularly offensive and that are likely to interfere with individual judgment, unless
they are specifically authorized by legislative bodies").
290 The first two prongs of the proposed test are adapted from the Supreme
Court's test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman for discerning whether government
regulations affecting the content of public school curricula violate the Establishment
Clause. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). To satisfy the Lemon test a statute first "must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted); see also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-94 (1987) (applying the Lemon test and hold-
ing that a state statute requiring teaching of "creation science" whenever evolution
theory is taught in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause); cf. Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (declining to apply the Lemon test and holding
that the Establishment Clause prohibits a rabbi from offering prayers as part of a
public school graduation ceremony).
Adaptation of the Lemon test for cases involving government speech about sub-
jects other than religion is somewhat problematic. The plain language of the Estab-
lishment Clause commands that government not endorse a particular religious
viewpoint. The First Amendment, on the other hand, does not plainly forbid the gov-
ernment from "establishing" any other type of viewpoint, such as one about particular
medical procedures. Nevertheless, incorporating a modified version of the Lemon
test to assess the constitutionality of state-compelled physician speech is defensible.
First, the biases that underlie viewpoint-based regulation of doctor-patient speech are
commonly rooted in a particular religious viewpoint. For example, regulations gov-
erning physician speech about contraception and abortion are grounded in part in the
religious belief that life begins at conception. Second, the first two prongs of the
Lemon test are designed to assess the purpose of government regulations compelling
speech. The test recognizes that the government's legitimate and necessary role in the
regulation of academic discourse ought not to permit it to promote a particular reli-
gious viewpoint by foisting it upon an impressionable and captive audience. To safe-
guard students' audience-based interests, the test provides a mechanism for
distinguishing between government regulations that serve legitimate and illegitimate
purposes. To protect patients from governmental manipulation and distortion of
medical discourse, it is similarly necessary to distinguish between regulations that aim
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pose, as opposed to an ideological or religious purpose;29' (2) not
advance a particular viewpoint regarding medical treatment or how the
patient ought to respond to a particular illness, diagnosis, or medical con-
dition, including pregnancy; (3) contain truthful, factually verifiable infor-
mation;2 92 and (4) avoid excessive government entanglement in
determining the content of doctor-patient discourse. Patients' audience-
based interests are unaffected by whether medical care is delivered by
privately or publicly funded physicians; thus, to protect patients' First
Amendment rights, courts must apply this test to regulations that compel
physician speech in either setting.
This test assumes that only the government's interest in protecting the
health of its citizens justifies the imposition of content restrictions on phy-
sician speech. To ascertain whether a regulation's purpose is medical or
ideological, and whether it is intended to advance the government's view-
point about a particular treatment, courts must examine the statute's lan-
guage, overall content, and, if necessary, its legislative history.293 The
to maintain the integrity of medical discourse and those that impose a particular view-
point upon vulnerable patients.
291 The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to invalidate otherwise constitu-
tional statutes because of the underlying legislative motivation. See Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[N]o case in this Court has held that a legisla-
tive act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivation of the men who
voted for it."); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise consti-
tutional statute on the basis of alleged illicit legislative motive."). However, the Court
commonly considers legislative intent when determining the validity of statutes. See,
e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
statute discriminating on basis of gender because legislative motive was based on ster-
eotyped assumptions); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (upholding zoning change because complainants failed
to prove discriminatory legislative intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232,
238-39 (1976) (upholding validity of test used to screen applicants for police force,
despite disparate effect on minority. applicants, due to failure to demonstrate discrimi-
natory intent). For probing analyses of legislative intent as an element of constitu-
tional review, see TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-6, at 821-25; John H. Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
292 The basis of this requirement is self-evident. By promulgating regulations that
would force physicians to utter false information, the state would impede the discov-
ery of truth and undermine patients' personal liberty interests. The Supreme Court
specifically endorsed a truthfulness requirement for government regulation of physi-
cian speech in Casey. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (noting that when the state requires that information be given to a
patient, such information must be truthful and not misleading).
293 The Supreme Court has used this method of divining legislative purpose to
determine whether regulations of public school curricula are based on the desire to
promote a particular religious viewpoint. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 ("A
court's finding of improper purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by
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government could satisfy this prong of the test by proving that the stat-
ute's purpose is to protect or promote the physical or mental health of the
patient or the public. However, if the government enacted a law that
compels physicians to express a clear preference for a particular medical
treatment or an opinion about what course of action a patient should
follow,2 94 the law would be unconstitutional because it promoted an ideo-
logical viewpoint.
In addition to examining a regulation's words, courts must determine
whether the compelled message, taken as a whole, expresses government
partisanship. One indicia of improper partisanship is underinclusive-
ness-that is, the imposition on doctors of unbalanced disclosure require-
ments that create the impression that government prefers one treatment
to another. 295 Regulations that single out a particular medical procedure
by requiring a detailed description of its associated risks, while not man-
dating a similarly detailed recitation of the risks associated with alterna-
tive treatments, suggest impermissible viewpoint bias.296 For example, a
statute that required detailed descriptions of the nature and risks of coro-
nary bypass surgery, but failed to require similar discussions about alter-
native treatments, would give rise to a presumption of improper
government partisanship against such surgery.297
Regulations that require doctors to convey information within patients'
common knowledge also suggest viewpoint bias. For example, a statute
the statute on its face, its legislative history, or its interpretation by a responsible
administrative agency.").
294 See, e.g., Pub. Act 81-1078, § 3.5(2), 1979 Ill. Laws 4108, 4115 (repealed 1984)
("The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child you are carrying is
a living human being whose life should be preserved."); 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1991)
("[T~he project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning.
... ).
295 In other constitutional contexts, this standard has been used to determine
improper motive. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593 (finding that statute's purpose to
promote religious viewpoint was revealed by fact that it singled out one subject
among many in public school curriculum); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
793 (1978) (stating that underinclusiveness of statute suggests improper legislative
motive to silence expression).
296 Anti-abortion regulators have employed the technique of requiring physicians
to present a lopsided depiction of medical risks as a way to persuade patients to opt
for childbirth. See supra notes 62-64.
297 To determine whether enactments that compel physician speech about abortion
violated a woman's right to privacy, the Burger Court recognized the need to scruti-
nize the overall context of the speech. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (invalidating an ordinance that required physi-
cians to describe numerous physical and psychological complications of abortion,
because its intent was to influence rather than inform by requiring the recitation of a" 'parade of horribles' intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous
procedure").
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that forced physicians to tell pregnant patients that their decision to have
an abortion would result in the termination of fetal development would
suggest an intent to advance childbirth over abortion, rather than to
ensure the disclosure of unknown, necessary information.298 Such a regu-
lation is very different from one that requires physicians to generally dis-
cuss with pregnant patients the possible impact of medications and
procedures on the developing fetus. Such regulations would serve a med-
ical purpose because they provide patients with information related to
the health of the fetus, do not single out particular medications or treat-
ments for regulation, and convey information beyond the scope of
patients' common knowledge.299
Finally, the fourth prong of the proposed test aims to protect physi-
cians' discretion to tailor the content of conversations with patients to
their individual needs and interests. 30 0 Recognition of physicians' right to
determine the content of conversations with patients, the medical ana-
logue of academic freedom, is not intended to protect the free speech
rights of physicians; nor does it mean that physicians have a greater right
to free speech than others. Rather, raising a doctor's right to determine
the content of conversations with patients to a constitutional level
acknowledges that doctors are in a unique position to indoctrinate, and
that a check against governmental excesses is needed.30 '
Thus, informed consent laws, which establish standards for disclo-
sure30 2 but leave the specific content to the physician's discretion, satisfy
298 Arguably, such a regulation would not satisfy the first prong of the proposed
test, because it is difficult to identify the medical purpose served by any regulation
that compels doctors to tell patients what they already know.299 A regulation of this type also satisfies the fourth prong of the test because it
would not supplant a physician's ability to tailor the specific content of conversations
with patients.
300 In City of Akron, the Burger Court held that a provision of the ordinance that
insisted "upon the recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of information" was
unconstitutional. Id. at 445. However, its conclusion was meant to safeguard physi-
cians' discretion to control disclosure, not patients' audience-based right to receive
information. Id. at 447.
301 Judicial recognition of the concept of "medical freedom" is not an unfettered
grant of discretion to doctors to determine the content of conversations with patients.
The government retains the power to enact informed consent statutes, which require
physicians to discuss alternative treatments and their material risks. Additionally,
medical licensing statutes vest the state with the power to ensure a minimum level of
competence among physicians.
102 Some jurisdictions adhere to the "professional custom standard," which
requires the disclosure of risks that a reasonably prudent physician would regard as
material. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16, ch. 144-206(a)(1) (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(2) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(3)(a)(1) (West Supp.
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905.1.A (West Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT.,
§ 44-2816 (1988); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2085-d(1) (McKinney 1993); TENN
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the proposed test."'3 Indeed, informed consent laws that do no more
than establish the subjects that doctors and patients must discuss resem-
ble regulations that mandate the subjects that must be included in a pub-
lic school's curriculum but leave teachers free to determine the specific
content of each course. Similarly, a statute that required physicians to
discuss the subject of organ donation with patients, but did not require
the expression of the government's opinion and left the specific content
of the conversation to the doctor's discretion, would likely satisfy the
test. 04
Depending on the evidence of legislative motive, regulations that com-
pel physicians to discuss the impact of a patient's medical decision upon
third parties may or may not meet the proposed test. 0 5 Consider, for
CODE. ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980). Other jurisdictions require the disclosure of risks
that a "reasonable patient" would regard as material. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT., § 09-
55-556(a) (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320(2) (Baldwin 1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.651 subd. 9 (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(c) (West Supp.
1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1991). Some commentators have advocated appli-
cation of a "subjective patient standard," which would require disclosure of risks that
the particular patient would regard as material. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 149, at
192-93 ("The physician would be required to describe all the risks that the physician
believes the patient would consider relevant in deciding whether to undergo treat-
ment, regardless of the importance that a 'reasonable person' would attach to those
risks.").
303 Informed consent statutes serve the medical purpose of providing patients with
empirical and experiential information about possible medical treatment options and
associated risks. They neither advance a particular viewpoint regarding a particular
treatment nor foster excessive government involvement in determining the specific
content of doctors' conversations with patients.
304 The National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988), satisfies the
proposed test. It aims to promote the public health by increasing the supply of organs
available for transplant. It does not advance the government's view about organ
donation, but merely requires that doctors discuss this subject with patients.
305 Statutes requiring physicians to counsel HIV-positive patients about the meth-
ods of HIV transmission and the need to ensure that their body fluids do not enter the
bodies of others satisfy the test, provided that the government requires similar coun-
seling for patients who have other kinds of infectious or communicable diseases. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(e) (West 1993) (requiring physicians to counsel
patients subjected to the HIV test about methods of transmission, the availability of
health care services, and the benefits of notifying contacts). These statutes aim to
protect the public health by seeking to curtail the spread of disease. They do not
advance a particular viewpoint regarding medical treatment; they contain truthful,
factual information; and they do not foster an excessive government entanglement in
the specific content of doctor-patient discourse. However, a statute requiring physi-
cians to tell HIV-positive patients to stop having sex would violate the proposed test
because it advocates a specific viewpoint regarding how patients should respond to
their illness. It also fosters an excessive government entanglement in determining the
specific content of doctor-patient conversations.
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example, a regulation that specifically required physicians to disclose to a
prospective kidney transplant recipient the risks to the live donor of
removing the organ."0 6 If the statute failed to compel physicians to dis-
close the risks to third parties of donating other bodily parts or fluids,
such as bone marrow, this would suggest the impermissible purpose of
discouraging patients from undergoing kidney transplants. °7
Undeniably, the proposed test strips the government of a powerful and
potentially effective means of communicating messages that many would
consider valuable and in the public interest.30 8 However, government
remains free to add its voice to public debate over medical treatments in
a variety of ways that do not infringe upon patients' audience-based
interests.30 9
CONCLUSION
Recent history confirms that basic democratic and humanitarian values
are endangered by government manipulation of the content of doctor-
patient discourse for the purpose of advancing an ideology. The medical-
ization of state ideology in Nazi Germany should remind us of the poten-
tial dangers of permitting government to enlist physicians in a
propaganda campaign. In the United States, governmental efforts to reg-
ulate the content of physician-patient discourse have not yet extended
beyond conversations about contraception and abortion. However, as
medical advances continue to present issues that challenge fundamental
beliefs about life and death, it is certainly conceivable that regulators who
oppose the availability of certain procedures or treatments may try to
prevent their use, on purely ideological grounds, by enacting measures
that limit or distort doctor-patient discourse about those subjects.
In Rust and Casey, the Rehnquist Court confronted for the first time in
Supreme Court history the issue of whether the First Amendment limits
the right of government to impose viewpoint-based restrictions upon the
content of doctor-patient discourse. Although the Court shirked a com-
prehensive free speech analysis of the question, it adopted the principle
306 The Casey plurality expressly discussed this example. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992) (plurality opinion).
307 Of course, under informed consent standards, the risks of removing the kidney
must be disclosed to the potential live donor.
308 For example, a consensus may exist that people ought to donate their organs,
yet the proposed test would prohibit the government from compelling physicians to
express this viewpoint to patients.
309 For example, government can communicate its viewpoint about a medical treat-
ment in handbills, television campaigns, or the print media. See Riley v. National
Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (invalidating as insufficiently narrow a
statute that compelled solicitors of charitable contributions to make certain disclo-
sures to potential donors, on grounds that the state could publish such information
itself).
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that the First Amendment does not rob government of the right to
impose viewpoint-based restrictions upon the content of doctor-patient
speech that occurs in the course of delivering both publicly and privately
financed health care. While the Court imposed some limitations on gov-
ernment's discretion in this realm, these restrictions succeed only in pro-
tecting physicians' speech rights. They fail to protect patients' audience-
based right to receive complete, unbiased medical information from their
physicians.
To prevent the imposition of the government's will upon the most pri-
vate and personal aspects of everyday life, it is critical to maintain a sepa-
ration between the state and doctor-patient discourse. The extension of
full First Amendment protection to doctor-patient discourse is necessary
to secure freedom of speech, to safeguard patients' constitutional right to
determine their medical treatment, and to prevent government from
imposing its orthodoxy upon medical decision making. Regulations that
silence physicians from speaking to patients about accepted or experi-
mental medical treatments violate the First Amendment because they
eliminate an entire category of information from doctor-patient dis-
course. They also raise the spectre of viewpoint discrimination, and dis-
tort patients' ability to make rational treatment decisions.
Similarly, regulations that compel physician speech may subvert
patients' audience-based interests if they have an ideological or religious,
as opposed to a medical, purpose; advance a particular viewpoint regard-
ing medical treatment or how a patient should respond to a certain diag-
nosis or condition; contain factually false information; or supplant
physicians' discretion to tailor the content of conversations to patients'
particular needs. It is therefore necessary to apply these criteria to deter-
mine the constitutionality of regulations that compel physician speech.
The test is not designed to prevent the government from enacting view-
point-neutral regulations intended to inform medical decision making. It
would, however, render unconstitutional any enactments that required
physicians to convey the government's partisan message about a particu-
lar treatment, or that biased a physician's presentation of medical alterna-
tives in accordance with government preferences.
